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IS REVENUE RULING 83-46 A "DUSTER" FOR
SERVICE CONTRIBUTORS SEEKING "TAX FREE"
POOL OF CAPITAL TREATMENT?
Juan E. Arrache, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most critical and important aspects of the oil indus-
try is its ability to generate sufficient working capital to maintain
and to increase its exploration activities so that it can continue to
service the ever-increasing energy needs of this country. Since the
first discoveries of oil in this country, development of capital has
been fostered, in part, by service providers contributing their services
instead of cash, to the acquisition, exploration, and development of
oil and gas properties. In the early days of the industry, in oil and
gas producing states such as Oklahoma, Texas, and California, the
person with a little cash, the prospector with a little knowledge of
geology, and the driller who owned a cable tool rig, would come
together to discover and to develop oil and gas producing wells. All
of them would share the joy of discovery or alternatively, the disap-
pointment of loss in having produced a "dry hole." 1
As time went on, more and more specialists contributed their
services, as did the cash and equipment investor, to the "pool of capi-
tal." Added to the list of types of contributions were the services of
the independent geologist/prospector, independent geologist/drilling
advisor, geologist/corporation, petroleum engineer, driller/drilling
corporation, tax shelter promoter, attorney, accountant, landman/in-
dependent contractor, landman/employee, and the corporation exec-
utive. Each contributed his services and each received an economic
interest in the property rather than a cash payment. 2
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1. A dry well is also known as a "duster."
2. A. Manganaris, Jr., Background Information Note, Control Number 2K9637, Indi-
vidual Income Tax Branch, Internal Revenue Service (Dec. 16, 1982) (This memorandum
was obtained from the IRS through a Freedom of Information Act, 5. U.S.C. § 552 (West
1977 and West Supp. 1984), request concerning Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 16 by John R.
Braden, C.P.A., Resident Tax Specialist, Independent Petroleum Association of America and
passed on to this commentator by Mr. Braden).
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Long before such decisions as Diamond,3 Frazell,' and James
A. Lewis Engineering, Inc.' received publicity, the service providers
did not usually recognize income until their property interest began
producing hydrocarbons. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) offi-
cially recognized this deferral policy in its General Counsel Memo-
randum (G.C.M.) 22730 memorandum in 19416 and this policy con-
tinued to influence IRS decisions with respect to service contributors
for over forty-two years. Then, without fanfare, the IRS issued Rev-
enue Ruling 83-46,' and some regard its cryptic message to be a
substantial shift in policy by the IRS.'
The ruling left the area unsettled because of the manner in
which the IRS chose to announce its change of direction, rather than
from the legal result of the ruling. This is because Revenue Ruling
83-46 offers a mere legal conclusion with no supporting analysis.
The oil industry has expressed dissatisfaction with the ruling.
Most of the criticism emanates from the smaller oil companies and
service contributors, such as geologists and land agents.9
3. Diamond v. Comm'r, 492 F.2d 286, (7th Cir. 1974) (receipt for services of a profit
share of a partnership which had a determinable market value was taxable as income when
received).
4. United States v. Frazell, 339 F.2d 885 (5th Cir. 1964) (receipt of a partnership inter-
est or stock in a corporation that had value was taxed as compensation income when received).
5. James A. Lewis Engineering, Inc. v. Comm'r, 339 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1964), aff g 39
T.C. 482 (1962) (services of a geologist contributed to a water floor project was held to be
services contributed to the production phase and not the acquisition, exploration, or develop-
ment phase and, thus, not within the pool of capital).
6. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214. This memorandum, written by the General Coun-
sel's office, set the IRS's policy of deferring recognition of income where personal services are
contributed in exchange for an oil and gas property interest.
7. Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 16. In this revenue ruling, the IRS considered whether
the present value of economic interests received for services contributed to oil and gas proper-
ties was income to the taxpayer in the year he received the economic interest, or whether the
income should be deferred to years when production commenced and actual cash proceeds from
the sale of hydrocarbons were received. The service providers considered were: 1) an attorney,
2) a corporate promoter of oil and gas syndications; and 3) an executive receiving an economic
interest as an incentive bonus. The IRS held that § 83 required that the taxpayer recognize
presently the value of the economic interest received in the year that it is received. The IRS
left open what impact the ruling would have on other service providers such as geologists and
well drillers. The controversy regarding the ruling stems from the fact that G.C.M. 22730 was
not even referred to in the new revenue ruling.
8. Burke, How Should an Economic Interest Acquired for Services be Treated After
Revenue Ruling 83-46?, 58 J. TAX'N 352, 356 (1983).
9. See, e.g., 19 Tax Notes No. 9, 77 (May 30, 1983) (a letter from Ray H. Potts,
president of the Oklahoma Independent Petroleum Association to the Treasury, which voiced
opposition to Rev. Rul. 83-46. Among its objections to the revenue ruling, the association states
that overriding royalty interests were received in exchange for "investment" of time and ser-
vices); 22 Tax Notes No. 10, 785 (Sept. 1983) (a letter from J.H. Parmenter, president of Del
Paso Exploration Co. in Rev. Rul. 83-46, argues that an overriding royalty interest has no
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Major oil companies1" rarely enter into a "pool of capital" ar-
rangement wherein contributors of services acquire an economic in-
terest in property they own. The practice has essentially been con-
fined to the smaller oil companies or independents." The
uncertainty caused by Revenue Ruling 83-46 greatly disadvantages
an important segment of the oil industry, particularly service con-
tributors such as the geologist, the promoter, the attorney, and the
corporate employee. The geologists are concerned because their ser-
vices are not addressed in the ruling, yet they have been sanctioned
in private letter rulings. They fear that their services may be the
next to be excluded by the IRS from the "pool of capital" treatment.
Thus, the holding of Revenue Ruling 83-46 will function as a force-
ascertainable value until the mineral is marketed and suggests that no value exists for inclusion
into gross income under I.R.C. § 83 (P-H 1984)); 21 Tax Notes No. 1, 13 (Oct. 3, 1983) (a
letter from William V. Knight, an independent geologist, from Tulsa, Okla., to Rep. James R.
Jones, D-Okla., forwarded to the Treasury Dep't. Mr. Knight opposed Rev. Rul. 83-46 and
stated that the ruling "discriminates against small businesses" by discouraging geologists from
accumulating overrides to form the capital needed for small oil companies); 21 Tax Notes No.
5, 379 (Oct. 31, 1983) (Joe H.E. Ward, president of the Society of Independent Professional
Earth Scientists, Midland, Tex., opposed Rev. Rul. 83-46 and favored the traditional "pool of
capital" concept recently reaffirmed in I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8047005 (July 24, 1980). He asks
the IRS to reconsider Rev. Rul. 83-46); 21 Tax Notes No. 8, 655 (Nov. 21, 1983) (in a letter
from a C.P.A. that Sen. John Tower forwarded to the Treasury, the C.P.A. contends Rev.
Rul. 83-46 is incorrect; that in two of the situations cited therein, there occurred acquisitions
of property with services rather than § 83 transfers of property for services. He stated; "Sec-
tion 83 does not relate to the acquisition of an interest in property); 22 Tax Notes No. 1, 12
(Jan. 2, 1984) (a letter from H.B. Scoggins, Counsel for the Independent Petroleum Associa-
tion of America,. Washington, D.C.: Mr. Scoggins pointed out that IRS agents were already
applying Rev. Rul. 83-46 to factual situations outside the scope of the ruling); 22 Tax Notes
No. 8, 661 (Feb. 20, 1984) (Mr. Scoggins again wrote to Treasury and provided the IRS with
a proposed modification of Rev. Rul. 83-46).
10. A major oil company is a large oil company whose stock is typically publicly held
and traded. Typically, the major oil company is a wholly integrated company whose assets
include oil and gas producing properties, refineries, and a product marketing and distribution
system. Some of the major oil companies are Shell Oil Co., Exxon, and Chevron. On the other
hand, independent oil companies tend to be smaller in size, closely-held entities and not inte-
grated in most instances. The Internal Revenue Code § 613A(c) provides a definition of an
Independent Producer for purposes of percentage depletion. The definition also applies in the
provisions concerning the Windfall Profits Tax.
11. Telephone interview with William V. Knight, C.P.G.S., independent geologist from
Tulsa, Okla. (June 11, 1984) (Mr. Knight is an alumnus of West Virginia Univ., Ohio State
Univ., and the Univ. of Tulsa and holds B.S. and M.S. degrees in geology and lectures to
nationwide audiences on acquisition, exploration, and development of oil and gas properties);
and telephone interview with Harold Bertholf, geologist from Sacramento, Cal. (June 11,
1984) (Mr. Bertholf attended Univ. of California at Santa Barbara, Univ.. of California at
Los Angeles, Univ. of So. California, and Loyola Law School. He holds B.S. and M.S. degrees
in geology, and is a consultant to government and industry); and telephone conversation with
J.H. Parmenter, geologist, and president of Del Paso Exploration to a contract land agent
(June 18, 1982) (Del Paso Exploration is primarily a contract land agent).
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ful deterrent to the formation of the "pool of capital." This, in turn,
will place an additional burden on the owner of the working interest
to both raise the necessary capital and to assume the full burden of
risk on speculative property. This deterrent will lead to less explora-
tion and development and will ultimately affect all consumers of
energy.
A substantial segment of the petroleum industry is affected; in-
dependents or small oil companies account for ninety-eight percent of
all the oil companies in the United States."2
This article examines the policy and law prior to Revenue Rul-
ing 83-46."8 It then examines the Revenue Ruling itself to determine
whether it marks a change in IRS policy or whether the ruling is an
attempt to clarify the policy reflected in its private letter rulings dur-
ing the 1970's and 1980's. Finally, this article will indicate which
service contributors the IRS may allow to continue to receive tax
deferred treatment.
The focus of the article will then shift to the tax effects of sec-
tion 8314 on the service contributor should Revenue Ruling 83-461"
apply to them. Some unique and interesting problems lie ahead in
the IRS's attempt to fully analyze the tax effects of section 6116 on
the service contributor's acquired economic interest.
The article will then explore alternate methods of structuring a
transaction to avoid Revenue Ruling 83-46, including joint ventures
or partnerships. The tax effects of a service contribution to the part-
nership will be considered in light of its practicability and accepta-
bility in the industry, and in terms of the tax effects on the service
contributor.
II. LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND HISTORY CONSIDERATIONS
The starting point in the analysis of tax consequences for the
contributor of services to an oil and gas property should be the rele-
vant social policy and legislative history of the statute governing tax-
ation of oil and gas properties. The focus on policy and legislative
12. See Comm'r v. Engle, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) V 9134 n.16 (U.S. 1984).
13. 1983-1 C.B. 16.
14. I.R.C. § 83 (P-H 1984). This section was added by Congress in 1969 to require the
inclusion into income that property received by a person performing services in exchange for
such property in the year received, or the year when transferred, or when substantial restric-
tions are removed. This section was perceived as needed for restricted property as an addition
to § 61, which is the general definition of income.
15. 1983-1 C.B. 16.
16. I.R.C. § 83 (P-H 1984).
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intent is particularly important because prior to Revenue Ruling 83-
46, the IRS decided that the congressional intent underlying section
83 suggested a change in the tax treatment of service providers to the
pool of capital. The IRS concluded that G.C.M. 22730 had been
"partially superseded by the 1954 Code, case law, and the 1969 Tax
Reform Act.""7 The foregoing discussion will demonstrate that this
conclusion is not warranted.
It is clear that in order for a government to exist and to execute
its proper functions, it must have a source of revenue. In the United
States, this source in large measure is the income tax system. The
scope and breadth of this taxing policy is expressed in section 61 of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1954."
A. Legislative History and Intent of Section 61
Section 61(a) was clearly intended to encompass income from
all sources. Therefore, it is quite naturally the starting point for the
courts and the IRS to analyze cases and rulings which treat the taxa-
tion of the service contributor. The IRS further defined the scope of
the section in Treasury Regulation 1.6119 which includes gross in-
come realized in the form of property, 0 income as compensation
paid in the form of property, 2' and particularly, property transferred
to an employee or independent contractor. 2 The courts, likewise,
have promulgated and fostered a broad definition of gross income
under section 61.28
What is significant about the legislative history of section 61 is
that its predecessor statutes had been on the books for twenty-eight
17. Internal Revenue Manual Transmittal, 4232.8-4; Internal Revenue Manual-Au-
dit, TAX. L. REV. (CCH) at 7271-26.
18. I.R.C. § 61 (P-H 1984) (which states in part: "Except as otherwise provided in this
subtitle, gross income means all income from whatever source derived, including (but not lim-
ited to) the following items: .. .(1) Compensation for services, including fees, commissions,
and similar items.") (emphasis added). The origin of § 61 can be traced to the Act of October
3, 1913, ch. 16 § II, B, G, 38 Stat. 167, 172 (1913). See also, 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 4155 (which indicates the breadth and scope of § 61 as well as the congressional intent
to retain the same meaning in the 1954 Internal Revenue Code stating: "This section corre-
spends to § 22(a) of the 1939 Code. While the language in existing § 22(a) has been simpli-
fied, the all-inclusive nature of statutory gross income has not been affected thereby. Section
61(a) is as broad in scope as § 22(a).").
19. Treas. Reg. § 1.61 (1956).
20. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-1(a) (1956).
21. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d)(1) (1956).
22. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2d(d)(2) (1956).
23. See, e.g., Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (denying, however, Congress
the power to tax a true stock dividend); Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955)
(including punitive damages in gross income).
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years before G.C.M. 22730 was decided. 4 Furthermore, there is no
evidence that Congress intended a change in the law each time the
income tax statutes were revised. On the contrary, the evidence avail-
able shows that Congress did not intend to change section 61.5 Fi-
nally, because Congress re-enacted section 61 in substantially the
same form as its predecessor, by principles of statutory construction,
Congress is presumed to have acquiesced to the IRS practices such as
G.C.M. 22730.20 This IRS memorandum deferred recognition of in-
come where services are exchanged for oil and gas property interests
in the "pool of capital."
Likewise, both the statute and regulations which include prop-
erty as compensation in the calculation of gross income27 existed for
some time before the passage of section 83 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1954.28 The IRS's interpretation that Congress intended to
preempt section 61 by enacting section 83 in 1954 with respect to the
treatment of an economic interest in an oil and gas property received
by a service contributor, is not based on any evidence of legislative
intent to that effect.29
B. Legislative History and Intent of Section 83
The policy considerations and legislative history behind section
83 are important to examine in order to fully analyze the IRS posi-
24. See, e.g., Act of May 28, 1938 ch. 289, § 22, 52 Stat. 457 which states:
(a) General Definition. -"Gross income" includes gains, profits and income
derived from salaries, wages, or compensation for personal service, . . . vaca-
tions, trades, businesses, commerce, or sales, or dealings in property, whether
real or personal, growing out of the ownership or use of or interest in such
property; also from interest, rent dividends, securities, or the transaction of any
business carried on for gain or profit, or gains or profits and income derived
from any source whatever.
Id. (emphasis added).
25. See supra note 18.
26. [Wlhere Congress recreates a statute it is presumed to have knowledge of
Treasury Regulations, court decisions, and administrative practice which have
interpreted and fixed the meaning of the terms used. In line with this reasoning,
there is a great body of cases holding that the reenactment of a statute substan-
tially unchanged is persuasive indication of the adoption by Congress of a prior
judicial construction thereof . . . . Also, it has been held that, where an admin-
istrative construction of a statute has been followed by Congressional reenact-
ment without changes, a rebuttable presumption is created that Congress ap-
proved such construction of the statute.
I J. MERTENS, JR., LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 3.22, at Ch. 3-p. 43 (Rev. 1981)
(emphasis added).
27. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-2(d) (1960).
28. I.R.C. § 83 (P-H 1984).
29. See supra note 18.
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tion in Revenue Ruling 83-46." Section 83, entitled "Property
Transferred in Connection With Performance of Services," was
adopted by Congress upon the recommendations of the President and
the Treasury Department as part of a series of reform measures.8 It
provides, in part, that if property is transferred "in connection with
performance of services" then the person performing the services
must include the fair market value of the property, less any amount
paid in gross income in the first taxable year in which the rights of
the person having the beneficial interest in such property are trans-
ferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture, which-
ever is applicable." 2
By adopting section 83, Congress did not intend to change the
law then existing under section 61 with respect to inclusion into
gross income the value of vested or unrestricted property"3 received
as compensation for services. What Congress did intend to do was to
clarify a very convoluted and uncertain area of the law concerning
restricted or nonvested property. This confusion arose from several
years of inconsistent rulings based on regulations which the IRS
promulgated. 4 Additionally, section 83 was proposed by the admin-
istration and adopted by Congress to stop a perceived abuse, the fail-
ure of employees to include the benefits of nonqualified, restricted or
deferred compensation plans in gross income.
It is important to note that the administration's proposal which
led to enactment of section 83, was referred to as "Restricted Stock
30. Since Congressional intent is the determining factor in the interpretation of a stat-
ute, the legislative history of a statute is extremely important. In determining Congressional
intent, it is important to seek the circumstances and causes prompting the enactments, the
public history of the times, and the evil to be remedied. See J. MERTENS, JR., supra note 24,
at § 3.26, 62 (Rev. 1981).
31. President's Tax Reform Proposals: Hearings on H.R. 1242 Before the House Ways
and Means Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (statement of Assistant Secretary of the Trea-
sury, Edward S. Cohen).
32. I.R.C. § 83(a) (P-H 1984).
33. Vested is defined as "Fixed; accrued; settled; absolute .... Having the character of
giving the rights of absolute ownership; not contingent; not subject to be defeated by a condi-
tion precedent." BLACK'S LAW DICrIONARY 1734 (4th ed. 1951). Restriction is defined as
follows: "To restrain within bounds; to limit; to confine." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1478
(4th ed. 1951). Vested and nonvested property as well as restricted and unrestricted property
for purposes of § 83 are defined at Treas. Reg. §§ 1.83-3 and 1.83-5 (1978).
34. See Reid, Property Transferred in Connection with Performance of Services under
Section 83-Effectuation of Tax Reform Act Purpose, 17 WAYNE L. REV. 1267 (1971); see
also Sexton and Boyle, How Proposed Section 83 Regs. Create Traps in Restricted Stock and
Stock Option Areas, 39 J. TAX'N 184 (1973) (which stated: "Section 83, which was enacted as
a part of the Tax Reform Act of 1969, was intended to equate treatment of nonqualified
restricted stock plans with similar types of deferred compensation arrangements."). Id.
1984]
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Plans" transferred in connection with performance of services.35 This
provides strong evidence that section 83 was originally designed for
the present taxation of the value received from restricted compensa-
tion plans which are only a very narrow form of property. In pro-
posing section 83, the House Report suggested that current law as of
1969 had no provision for rules to govern restricted stock plans. The
House envisioned section 83 would override that situation. 6
Likewise, the Senate Report adopted essentially the same lan-
guage as the House Report in articulating the then-current status of
the law and the reasons for the change.3 7 Finally, the Conference
Report conclusion contains the policy theme and intent of the House
and Senate Reports and mandates that the special rules of section 83
be applied to restricted property, and particularly to stock. 8
The above-cited authorities make clear that Congress was at-
35. The Proposal
A. Time of Imposition of Tax. Under the proposal, an employee would be
subject to tax at the time he acquires a nonforfeitable interest in the restricted
stock (or other property). For this purpose, only substantial forfeitures would be
taken into account. Thus, for example, requirements that the stock be returned
to the employee if the employee commits a crime against the employer, or if he
accepts employment with a firm in competition with the employer, would be
disregarded as insubstantial. On the other hand, a requirement that the stock be
returned to the employer if the employee fails to complete an additional period
of service with the employer would be considered substantial, and the employee
would not be considered to acquire a nonforfeitable interest until he completes
that period of service.
Technical Explanations, Restricted Stock Plans in the President's Tax Reform Proposals,
Hearings on H.R. 1242 Before the House Ways and Means Comm., 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 236
(1969) [hereinafter cited as Technical Explanations].
36. Present law. Present law does not contain any specific rules governing the tax treat-
ment of deferred compensation arrangements known as restricted stock plans ....
General reasons for change. The present treatment of restricted stock plans is
significantly more generous than the treatment specifically provided in the law
for similar types of deferred compensation arrangements ....
• ..To the extent that a restricted plan can be considered a means of giving
employer a stake in the business, your committee believes the present tax treat-
ment of these plans is inconsistent with the specific rules provided by Congress
in the case of qualified stock options, which were considered by Congress as the
appropriate means by which an employee could be given a shareholder's inter-
est in the business.
H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1645, 1733-35 (emphasis added).
37. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE.CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2027, 2150-52.
38. The House bill provides that a person who receives compensation in the form of
property, such as stock which is subject to a restriction generally is to be taxed on the value of
the property at the time of its receipt unless his interest is subject to a substantial risk of
forfeiture. CONF. REP. No. 782, 91st Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 2392, 2418 (emphasis added).
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tempting to fill a void by adopting rules that align nonqualified, re-
stricted or deferred compensation plans with qualified plans, and
thereby to eliminate the disparity of treatment between the two.
As noted, the plain language of this section suggests that its pro-
visions apply only in the case of property subject to a restriction. 9 A
cardinal rule of statutory construction is that the plain, obvious, and
rational meaning of words should be used in constructing a statute.40
Here the words plainly mean that the only subject matter governed
by section 83 is restricted property.
The legislative history and legislative intent analysis suggests
that section 83 plainly does not apply to the factual patterns found in
Revenue Ruling 83-46."' While not expressed in the Revenue Rul-
ing, it is assumed that in each case, the taxpayer was conveyed a
present vested overriding royalty interest.42 The conveyance was un-
conditional, not subject to any restrictions, and certainly neither sub-
ject to substantial forfeiture, nor restricted in transferability of the
interest. Likewise, in the oil and gas industry, service contributors to
the "pool of capital" typically receive unrestricted economic interests
39. See supra note 14.
(a) General Rule. If in connection with the performance of services, property is
transferred to any person other than the person for whom such services are
performed the excess of -
(1) the fair market value of such property (determined without regard to
any restriction other than a restriction which by its terms will never lapse) at
the first time the rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such
property are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk of forfeiture,
whichever occurs earlier, over
(2) the amount (if any) paid for such property, shall be included in the
gross income of the person who performed such services in the first taxable year
in which the rights of the person having the beneficial interest in such property
are transferable or are not subject to a substantial risk offorfeiture, whichever
is applicable ....
I.R.C. § 83(a) (P-H 1984) (emphasis added).
40. J. MERTENS, Jr., supra note 26.
41. The Revenue Ruling concerned services performed by (1) an attorney, (2) a corpo-
rate promoter of oil and gas syndications, and (3) an executive or a corporation in exchange for
an oil and gas property interest. Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 16.
42. An overriding royalty is defined as follows: "As applied to an existing oil and gas
lease is a given percentage of gross production payable to some person other than the lessor or
persons claiming under him." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARv 1287 (4th ed. 1957). An overriding
royalty interest is defined by the IRS as
an economic interest of oil and gas in place, vested from the evolving interest
that entitles its owner to a specified portion of gross production, free of operat-
ing and development costs. The terms of an overriding royalty interest is coex-
tensive with the terms of the working interest from which it was created. Thus
the transfer of an overriding royalty is an assignment of a property interest and
is not an anticipatory assignment of income.
Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983, C.B. 16, 17 (emphasis added).
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in oil and gas properties for their investment. Given the plain mean-
ing of the language, as well as the clear legislative history of section
83, it is difficult to determine how the IRS supports its contention
that section 83 applies to the factual situations in the Revenue
Ruling.
The IRS suggests, in opposition to the legislative intent argu-
ment, that Treasury regulations adopted under section 83 provide a
broad definition of the concept of property for the purpose of section
83, and do not merely limit the section's application to restricted
stock arrangements.48 This argument, however, misses the mark for
both the legislative history and the plain meaning of the language of
section 83, and compels the conclusion that the section applies to
restricted property not to unrestricted property. As to unrestricted
property, section 61 continues to apply as it has since the inception
of its predecessor in 1913. Furthermore, Treasury Regulation section
1.83-1(a) simply restates section 83 by using substantially equivalent
language."" The plain meaning of the language of the regulation fur-
ther suggests that section 83 does not apply to unrestricted property.
Nor do the regulations expressly provide for the specific tax treat-
ment of a conveyance of an economic interest in oil and gas. Other
sections of the Internal Revenue Code, however, do specifically ad-
dress the compensation method. The treatment of both percentage
depletion under section 613A of the Internal Revenue Code of
19544' and cost depletion under sections 611 and 612 of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954 are specific."' Revenue Ruling 83-46 appears
to be another attempt by the IRS to improperly enlarge the scope of
43. See supra note 2.
44. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-1(a) (1978) which states:
(a) Inclusion in gross income--() General rule. Section 83 provides rules for
the taxation of property transferred to an employee or independent contractors
(or beneficiary thereof) in connection with the performance of services by such
employee or independent contractor. In general, such property is not taxable
under section 83(a) until it has been transferred (as defined in § 1.83-3(a) to
such person and become substantially vested (as defined in § 1.83-3(b))) in
such person. In that case, the excess of -
(i) The fair market value of such property (determined without regard to
any lapse restriction, as defined in § 1.83-3(i) at the time that the property
becomes substantially vested, over
(ii) The amount (if any) paid for such property,
shall be included as compensation in the gross income of such employee or inde-
pendent contractor for the taxable year in which the property becomes substan-
tially vested. Id. (emphasis added).
45. I.R.C. § 613A (P-H 1984).
46. I.R.C. §§ 611-12 (P-H 1984).
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a statute. 7
It has been suggested that while Congress did not expressly val-
idate the "pool of capital" doctrine, it did implicitly consent to the
doctrine later by enacting section 636 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 195448 in the very same act in which section 83 was adopted.49
And the IRS has indirectly admitted that the enactment of section
636 did not affect the pool of capital doctrine as expounded in
G.C.M. 22730.0 In 1969, the Administration, through the Treasury
Department, perceived as an abuse the carved-out or retained pro-
duction payment5' as well as the infamous ABC transaction.52
Through section 636(a)-(b), Congress converted the production
payment which heretofore was recognized and treated as an eco-
nomic interest in oil and gas property, into either a loan in the case
of a carved-out production payment or a purchase money mortgage
in the case of a retained production payment. An important excep-
tion was carved out of section 636(a) which goes to the "pool of
capital" theory. Section 636(a) would continue to recognize and to
treat a production payment as an economic interest if the payment is
47. The Treasury may not make an arbitrary or unreasonable Regulation nor
can it restrict or enlarge the scope of a statute, supply a supposed omission,
create an exemption, . . . or nullify prior judicial construction of the statute.
Although the Commissioner has authority to issue regulations for the enforce-
ment of the revenue laws, such authority does not extend to the establishment of
rules of substantive law creating presumptions which are out of harmony with
the statutory provisions involved.
J. MERTENS, JR., supra note 26, at § 3.21, Ch. 3-p. 39.
48. See Burke, supra note 8, at 354. I.R.C. § 636 (P-H 1984).
49. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 83 Stat. 487, 588 (1969).
50. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 7401280010A (1974) stating:
The provisions of section 636 of the Code and the regulations thereunder do not
affect the Internal Revenue Service position set out in G.C.M. 22730 in the
determination of whether a production payment carved out of an oil and gas
property is pledged for exploration or development of such oil and gas property.
Id.
51. See Technical Explanations, supra note 35.
52. C. ABC Transactions
The retained production payment is utilized in connection with the so-
called ABC transaction. In an ABC transaction A, the owner, sells a mineral
property to B (who will own and operate the property) for a small down pay-
ment, and A reserves a production payment (a part of the working interest) for
the major portion of the purchase price. A then sells the production payment to
C (who is often a bank, a tax-exempt charity, or pension fund). A realizes
capital gain on the sale of his interest to C and B. C receives income subject to
depletion (normally cost depletion sufficient to eliminate taxable income) on the
production payment. B excludes the production payment from his income. Until
recently, B was permitted to deduct, currently, the expenses of producing the
minerals applied to the production payment.
Id. at 107.
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assigned for exploration or development.6
This interest, a carved-out production payment, was the very
type of interest which was conveyed to the well driller (designated as
"E") in G.C.M. 22730. The conveyance in that instance was not
conditioned and not restricted, and hence, was not the type of pay-
ment which would fall within the purview of section 83. This sug-
gests that the IRS position in Revenue Ruling 83-46 which rests on
its interpretation of section 83, is unreasonable in light of the sec-
tion's history and purpose and hence, it must fail. 4
From the foregoing analysis of policy considerations and legisla-
tive history of sections 61 and 83, one can logically conclude that
section 83 does not apply to the conveyance of an economic interest
in oil and gas property of an investor of services in cases where the
conveyance is vested and not restricted. As a general rule, section 61
requires the inclusion of property transferred as compensation for
services, at its fair market value, in the taxable year in which it is
received. However, there is a long-standing administrative practice of
excluding services invested into the reservoir of capital oil and gas
properties, a practice which has survived at least two major revisions
of the Internal Revenue Code in 1939 and 1954. One can assume
that Congress did not intend to change the "pool of capital" theory.
Therefore, if the IRS is going to change its direction, it should not
do so on the theory that section 83 compels such a change.
C. National Policy Considerations
Does any good policy reason exist for a change in the IRS ad-
ministrative practice and its resulting longstanding interpretation of
section 61 today? National policy considerations suggest there is no
such policy reason. As an energy source, oil and gas is crucial to
53. However, in this application the principle may be simply stated as follows: if the
owner of a working interest assigns a carved production payment to another party who makes
a contribution to the exploration for or development of a mineral property, or assigns a pro-
duction payment for a cash consideration that is pledged to be used in the exploration for
development of a mineral property, he does not realize taxable income. In the former case, the
assignor is entitled to no deduction for the expenditures incurred by the assignee in the devel-
opment of the property, and in the latter case, the assignor is required to offset the cash
received against appropriate exploration and development costs. Under the Tax Reform Act, a
production payment carved out under these circumstances would constitute an economic inter-
est in the property and the holder of such a carved-out production payment would be taxable
on the income, and allowed depletion in respect of such income. I.R.C. § 636(a) (P-H 1954);
see also F. BURKE & R. BOWHAY, 1984 Income Taxation of Natural Resources § 6.18, 612
(1984).
54. See Comm'r v. Engle, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) I 9134, at 83, 111 (U.S. Oct. 10,
1984).
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every business enterprise and in fact, to every person within the
United States. One need only reflect momentarily on the catastrophic
effect of the shift in the economic structure of the oil and gas indus-
try in 197355 to understand that oil and gas are the life-blood of the
economy. As a result of the 1973 experience, the United States has
been attempting to formulate a comprehensive national energy policy
in order to become energy self-sufficient within the next several
years. Although the efforts of this policy have been somewhat ob-
scure from time to time,66 this strong national policy ought to en-
courage domestic production of oil and gas while reducing depen-
dence on foreign sources of crude oil and natural gas. It is
abundantly clear, in any event, that income tax measures clearly
produce changes in the economy and have a profound effect on. busi-
nesses and industries."
The United States has always had a strong policy of promoting
competition and fostering small business. This is evident from such
sweeping protective legislation as the Sherman Antitrust Act,"8 the
Clayton Antitrust Act 59 and from several programs such as the
grants, direct government loans, insured loans, and guarantee pro-
grams of the Small Business Administration for small business, and
the Farmer's Home Administration for farmers.
Congress has also evidenced its intent to promote and to assist
smaller oil companies by preserving to some degree the percentage
depletion allowance in section 613A.60 To assist independent produc-
55. The formation of the O.P.E.C. cartel and the Arab Embargo of 1973 precipitated a
rise in the world price of oil in excess of 300%. In a few short months, the wholesale price
index rose 54% in a three-year period from 1972-75. 1 J. CAMPBELL, JR., J. CAMPBELL, SR.,
AND R. CAMPBELL, MINERAL PROPERTY ECONOMICS, PRINCIPLES AND STRATEGIES, 111
(1978).
56. N. TURE & B. SANDEN, THE EFFECTS OF TAX POLICY ON CAPITAL FORMATION,
30-31 (1977) (the authors examine the effects of the federal income tax and conclude the
present system provides negative incentives for savings and for investment and suggest changes
to the system).
57. T. REESE, THE POLICIES OF TAXATION 208 (1980) (Reese states that: "Usually the
Treasury conducts intensive research before there can be reform. Taxes affect economic condi-
tions, business and individuals .... ) See also N. TURE & B. SANDEN, supra note 56.
58. Sherman Antitrust Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version 15 U.S.C. § 1 (West
1984)).
59. Clayton Antitrust Act, ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §
12 (West 1982)).
60. I.R.C. § 613A (P-H 1984). In 1975, Congress generally repealed the percentage
depletion allowance for oil and gas producers with the exception of independent producers and
royalty owners. Today, independents and royalty owners are entitled to a depletion allowance
of 15% of gross income on production limited to 1,000 barrels of crude oil produced per day or
6,000,000 million cubic feet of natural gas or a combination of the two. See F. BURKE & R.
BOWHAY, 1984 INCOME TAXATION OF NATURAL RESOURCES § 8.19, at 823-24 (1984) (Ini-
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ers or small oil companies and to encourage domestic production,
Congress reconfirmed the policy established in section 613 by provid-
ing lower rates and exemptions for producers with the Windfall
Profits Tax.6"
Perhaps the best policy reasons for continuing the pool of capi-
tal doctrine, as it applies to persons investing their services, are set
forth in G.C.M. 22730.62 An investor in an oil and gas property,
whether an investor of services or of money, ultimately looks to the
"mining" of the hydrocarbons for his return on investment."3 A frac-
tional economic interest, whether a production payment, oil pay-
ment, or overriding royalty interest prior to discovery has very little
value, if any, in relation to the amount invested. This is particularly
true before production is firmly established." In other words, the
investor of either services or money assumes a substantial risk of
completely losing his return on investment. Similarly, if the project is
successful, the rewards are great for the investor. The owner of the
working interest, by engaging the cash investor or service provider,
substantially reduces his need to personally provide capital to the
project. In short, the owner of the working interest shares the bur-
den of risk of loss with the service contributor. The arrangement
fulfills the policy objectives of expansion and development of domes-
tic crude oil production and lessening dependence on foreign imports.
tially, the allowance for oil depletion was 2,000 barrels per day and the percentage was gradu-
ally reduced from 22% down to 15%).
61. Pub. L. No. 223, Tit. I, § 101(a)(1) (1980) (I.R.C. § 4986 (P-H 1984)). The
Windfall Profits Tax was adopted as a temporary excise or severance tax applying to domesti-
cally produced crude oil. It was enacted to absorb what Congress perceived as excess profits
occurring from two unusual events, the rise in world prices as a result of the O.P.E.C. oil
cartel and the administration's decision to remove domestic crude price controls which had
been in effect since shortly after the Arab Embargo in the fall of 1973. The Senate believed
that the form of the tax would not adversely affect the incentive of the oil companies to pro-
duce oil. See S. REP. No. 394, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 410, 414-17. "The Finance Committee substitute is intended to tax a fair share of the
additional revenues received by oil producers and royalty owners as a result of oil price decon-
trol in a way that will not adversely affect incentives to produce domestic oil." Id. at 417. The
Conference Committee Report provides for independents exempt from the tax or eligible for
reduced tax rates, on part or all of their production. Joint Explanatory Statement of the Com-
mittee of Conference, H. REP. No. 304, 96th Cong., 2nd Sess., reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 642, 645. See also id. (which discusses the exemption for independent
producers owning working interests and royalty holders where the owner of the working inter-
est is an independent producer).
62. 1941-1 C.B. 214.
63. Id. at 221.
64. Telephone conversation with Harold W. Bertholf, geologist, from Sacramento, Cal.
(June 11, 1984), and telephone conversation with J.H. Parmenter, geologist and president of
Del Paso Exploration from Sacramento, Cal. (June 18, 1984).
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It accomplishes these goals because assistance with capital formation
and risk- spreading encourages the owner of the working interest to
engage in projects involving properties where the evidence of hydro-
carbons is uncertain or somewhat speculative, a risk he often would
not take without the help of others. Historically, such transactions
were attractive to the cash investor or service contributor primarily
for business purposes. The investor evaluated the business risks asso-
ciated with the transaction before investing cash, services, or equip-
ment. However, as will be seen, Revenue Ruling 83-46 creates in-
surmountable disincentives to the service contributor by requiring
him to pay the tax liability before he knows wvhen or if he will real-
ize actual income from oil or royalty payments.65
The case of Commissioner v. Engle66 is relevant to the issue at
hand not so much for its holding, but for its use of the risk analysis
which is the very same used by the Revenue Service in G.C.M.
22730. The court reviewed the long-standing industry practice
wherein lessors negotiate and pay bonuses and royalties to reduce the
cost of leases. The court observed that lessors were willing to enter
into bonus and advanced royalty arrangements because of the availa-
bility of percentage depletion. If the deductions were no longer avail-
able, lessors would be inclined to accept bonuses or advances at
higher amounts in order to pass on the tax cost to the lessee or alter-
natively, would require higher annual royalties over time. The court
concluded that the IRS interpretation of section 613A would mean
less capital would be available for leases and would result in less
exploration and development. 67 The court suggested that the deplet-
able bonus and reduced lease costs and allows for a "pooling of the
risk" between lessor and lessee.6" The court stressed repeatedly that
65. Apparently, the IRS takes the position that an overriding royalty always has some
value even if the prospect is a rank wild cat (conference with John Braden, C.P.A. with the
Independent Petroleum Producer Association of America (June 11, 1984)).
66. Comm'r v. Engle, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9134 (U.S. Oct. 10, 1984). The
court held that legislative history supported the notion that Congress intended to assist inde-
pendent producers and to encourage domestic production of oil. The case provides an excellent
review of industry practices in capital formation and risk-taking, which is the foundation of
the pool of capital doctrine, which was first espoused in Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551
(1933).
67. Comm'r v. Engle, 84-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9134, at 83, 108. "Lessees who are
forced to pay increased royalties will, in turn, have less money with which to produce leases or
to extract minerals therefrom."
68. . . . But since lessees can spread their risks over many leased properties,
they predictably will be willing to pay nonrefundable lease bonuses in exchange
for reduced prices on the overall lease arrangements. By pooling risks in this
fashion, lessors and lessees, like insurers and their insureds, optimize the allo-
cation of resources in the production of oil and gas from the property.
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Congress adopted section 613A to encourage development of domes-
tic production and to support the small oil companies.69
Like the advanced royalty and the bonus, the "pool of capital"
doctrine is also an important method of developing capital for an
exploration program and for spreading the risk of loss. Revenue
Ruling 83-46 clearly runs contrary to the business objectives of this
industry and national policy goals.
7 0
A conclusion that can be drawn from a review of the legislative
history is that contracting the "pool of capital" doctrine runs con-
trary to a well-established national policy of enhancing domestic
crude oil production and promoting competition between the inde-
pendent petroleum producers in the United States. Particularly, it is
counterproductive to what Congress was trying to accomplish in pre-
serving percentage depletion for independent producers.
III. THE CASE LAW
In order to put the Service's position in Revenue Ruling 83-46
in perspective, it is necessary to review briefly the cases which have
raised the issue of taxability of economic interests in oil and gas
properties which are transferred in return for investment of services
in the pool of capital. The issue has arisen in a number of cases as a
Id. at 4037 (emphasis added).
69. Congress wanted to encourage domestic production and to improve the competitive
position of "small producers"-the independents and the royalty owners-vis-a-vis the major
integrated ones. Section 613A's goal, more simply put, was to subsidize the combined efforts of
small producers and royalty owners in the exploration and production of the nation's oil and
gas resources. Any reasonable interpretation of the statute, therefore, must harmonize with this
goal. Id. at 4037. The Court also stated: "The House and Senate debates of the 1975 Congress
are replete with references to the nation's domestic oil and gas shortage." Id.
Similarly, Senator Dole stated that the 2000 barrel figure "identiffied] the par-
ticular importance of independent producers." . . . Senator Dole believed that
the exemption from the depletion allowance [would] permit most of these small
producers to remain in production, giving us the additional oil and gas that we
so greatly need. . . .It would also encourage most of the independents who do
the vast bulk of exploration in the country to continue their drilling programs.
Id. (emphasis added).
70. Shapiro, Restricted Property Received as Compensation for Services, 22 THE TAX
LAWYER, 529, 538 (1969). Some support for this contention can be gleaned from a recent
Supreme Court case entitled Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, wherein the Court held that
the Revenue Ruling therein was a valid interpretation and adhered to national policy. Con-
gress had not enacted a statute concerning the issue raised in the ruling. The case implies that
if the Revenue Ruling in question had not followed national policy, then it would have been
invalid. The Court is suggesting that IRS rulings ought to be coordinated with national policy.
U.S.-, 103 S. Ct. 2017 (1983). The case involved a 1971 Revenue Ruling, Rev.
Rul. 27-447, 1971-2 C.B. 230, denying tax exempt status under I.R.C. § 501 (c)(3) (P-H
1984) to schools violating the national policy against social discrimination.
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result of an IRS attempt to meet the demands of section 61 and its
predecessor statutes. However, it appears that initially the courts,
particularly the tax court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals,
recognized that something unique occurs when an economic interest
is transferred in return for an investment of services in the acquisi-
tion, exploration and development of an oil and gas property. What
appears to happen is that each participant invests something of
value-whether money, equipment, or services into a hydrocarbon
bearing prospect. Each participant then shares both the risk of fail-
ure, and the anticipation of profit, while providing a source of capi-
tal for the owner of the working interest. Justice O'Connor surely
had this principal business motivation in mind in the policy consid-
erations discussed in Engle.7
While the Court's decisions after Palmer did not always articu-
late the "pool of capital" doctrine as the basis for exempting service
providers from the general inclusion rule of section 61, Palmer influ-
enced the cases. Certainly Palmer influenced the IRS because the
pool of capital doctrine was adopted as the theory supporting the
Service's position in G.C.M. 22730.72 The IRS then expanded the
reasoning of the Court in G.C.M. 22730 by interjecting that as the
property interests in oil and gas are passed on to those contributing
services, equipment, and cash to the property, there is a sharing of
71. See supra note 66. Furthermore in Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933), wherein
the "pool of capital" doctrine was first articulated, the Court stated:
Thus, throughout their changing relationships with respect to the properties, the
oil in the ground was a reservoir of capital investment of the several parties, all
of whom, the original lessors, the two partnerships and their transferees, were
entitled to share in the oil produced. Production and sale of the oil would result
in its depletion and also in a return of capital investment to the parties accord-
ing to their respective interests.
Id. The Court went on to state in concise language the policy compelling the decision therein;
the same policy consideration repeated in Engle:
The statute made effective the legislative policy favoring the discovery of oil, by
valuing his capital investment for purposes of depletion at the date of the discov-
ery rather than at its original costs. The benefit of it accrues to the discovery if
he operates the well as owner or lessee, or if he leases it to another.
Id.
72. The Court stressed the general view that all persons having a right to share
in the oil produced or the proceeds from its sale irrespective of the legal form of
their interest in the property, have an economic interest in the oil and gas in
place to which the depletion allowance shall be allocated between lessor and
lessee, being held to be found enough to provide, at least, for every case in
which the taxpayer has acquired by investment any interest in the oil in place,
or has secured, by any form of legal relation, income derived from the extraction
of oil to which he must look for a return of his capital.
G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214, 216 (emphasis added).
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the burden of the risk of a dry hole."
The IRS then makes the leap from a depletion allowance to
carving the exception to section 61 in G.C.M. 22730.
If the driller or equipment dealer is making an investment by
which he acquires an economic interest in oil and gas in place,
expenditures made by him represent capital expenditures re-
turnable tax-free through depletion allowance rather than by
way of expense deduction, and the oil payment rights acquired
do not represent payment in property for services rendered or
supplies furnished.7 4
By so stating, the IRS announced its position that the service pro-
vider would not have to count as income the fair market value of the
economic interest acquired. He would recognize income from the oil
as it was produced and sold. And the income would be subject to
depletion.
Adopting this policy was a clear reversal of the Service's posi-
tion for several years prior to G.C.M. 22730." The well drillers
apparently were the first to present this issue to the courts. Commis-
sioner v. Edwards Drilling Co.,7" Cook Drilling Co. v. Commis-
sioner,"T and Dearing v. Commissioner.7 8 In each case, the IRS has
73. The point assumes importance in view of the many contracts entered into by
owners of lessee interests with well drillers to drill wells, equipment dealers to
furnish equipment and investors to furnish money for use in developing the
leased property in return for agreements to make stated payments out of a share
of the oil. By such arrangements, a lessee commonly lessens his own investment
and the risks and burdens attending development by agreements to share the
investment obligation and the proceeds of production. The lessee or assignee,
like the lessor or assignor who retained a share of the interest in production
having a value equivalent to that of the lessor's prior interest but has passed on
to the lessee the investment obligations and risks that attend development for a
share in production, has parted with no capital interest but has merely in turn
given another a right to share in production in consideration of an investment
made by such other person.
Id. at 221 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 221-22 (emphasis added).
75. The policy reversal was probably triggered by a- series of defeats in court for the
IRS, where it asserted the contrary position, that the value of the economic interest was includ-
ible in gross income when received, or alternatively when the property began producing. Inter-
estingly, none of the cases are mentioned in G.C.M. 22730.
76. Comm'r v. Edwards Drilling Co., 95 F.2d 719, 38 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9211
(5th Cir. 1938) (a well driller contracted to drill wells in exchange for oil payments and the
court held that the present discounted value of the payments were not includible when the
contract was entered into, but when the payments were received).
77. Cook Drilling Co. v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 291 (1938) (also involved a well driller
who received oil payments by contract for drilling wells. The Board of Tax Appeals held that
the oil payments already received were to be included in gross income, but the present worth of
future payments was not includible as being too speculative and contingent on future events).
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argued that the taxpayer must include in gross income the present
worth of future oil payments as compensation for services rendered.
The courts, however, have held that while actual oil payments re-
ceived during the taxable year should be included in gross income,
the value of future payments should not be included in the year in
which the interest is received primarily on grounds that future pay-
ments are speculative and uncertain of actually being received in the
future. 9
The IRS argued varying approaches to support its theory. The
first approach was that where the taxpayer kept its books on an ac-
crual basis, the receipt of an interest in future oil payments must be
accrued as income when the events occur to fix the amounts due and
determine liability to pay. 80 However, the IRS did not limit its at-
tack to accrual basis taxpayers. Its second approach challenged cash
basis taxpayers as well, arguing "the right to receive in the future
the agreed oil payments was, when the well turned out a producer, a
property having present market value, and, therefore, was a taxable
gain in the year the well was completed . . .... " The holding in
78. Dearing v. Comm'r, 102 F.2d 91, 39-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9344 (5th Cir.
1939) (the IRS argued unsuccessfully that the present worth of the value of the payments were
includible in the driller's income when the wells were completed).
79. The holdings of these cases are confused somewhat because of the different ap-
proaches the courts took to the question of whether each of the drillers in question could take a
percentage of the depletion allowance deduction in addition to expensing the drilling costs
under I.R.C. § 162 (P-H 1984). The courts took a formalistic approach and suggested that
because the oil payment agreement was personal or contractual in nature, they did not rise to
the level of an economic interest in the oil in place and, therefore, a depletion deduction was
denied. A later case pointed out that administrative practice and case law removed the differ-
ences between a royalty and an oil payment so that both are now considered an economic
interest in the oil in place allowing depletion, but not allowing the costs to be deducted from
production. See Lee v. Comm'r, 126 F.2d 825, 42-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9375 (5th Cir.
1942), aff'd, 42 B.T.A. 1217. This is also the approach taken in G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B.
2143, namely the costs are capitalized and returned through depletion). The approach was
tacitly sanctioned in Comm'r v. Rowan Drilling Co., 130 F.2d 62, 42-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9628 (5th Cir. 1942), affid, 44 B.T.A. 189 (the court held that a driller who received an
economic interest in the property on which he performed the well drilling service has made
capital investment and must return his cost through depletion, not through an I.R.C. § 162(c)
(P-H 1984) deduction). In Rowan, however, the court rejected the IRS contention that because
the taxpayer had taken a § 162 deduction in 1931, he had no basis to deplete in 1932. The
court stated that percentage depletion does not require a cost basis as a prerequisite for the
deduction.
80. Comm'r v. Edwards Drilling Co., 95 F.2d 719, 38-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9211,
at 9714 (5th Cir. 1938); see also Cook Drilling co. v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 291 (1938) (also an
accrued taxpayer case); see also Treas. Reg. § 1.446(c)(ii) (1960): "Accrual method, generally
under an accrual method, income is to be included for the taxable year when all events have
occurred which fix the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be determined
with reasonable accuracy."
81. Dearing v. Comm'r, 102 F.2d 91, 91, 39-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) V 9334, at 9790
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each instance was that the present value of future oil payments is not
includible in gross income, which draws direct support from Burnett
v. Logan.
82
The Logan case adopted the concept of the "open transaction,"
which provided that where a property interest or contract might be
received in the sale or exchange, and the fair market value for in-
come tax purposes is not ascertainable because of indefinite deferred
payments, the transaction is not closed but rather stays open until all
payments are received. This provides for recovery of basis first then
gain thereafter in the tax periods corresponding to the receipt of the
payments. In reading its conclusion, the Court stated: "The liability
for income tax ultimately can be fairly determined without resort to
mere estimates, assumptions and speculation. When the profit if
any, is actually realized, the taxpayer will be required to respond."
Since Logan, the IRS has attempted to curtail the application of the
"open transaction" principle.8" It has nearly abolished the income
tax deferral technique wherein basis is recouped before gain or loss
is recognized,. by requiring a pro-rata recovery of basis over the life
of the contract or in the alternative, over a pre-determined time pe-
riod." Despite these changes with respect to basis, the portion of the
Logan rule which precludes inclusion into gross income of future
indeterminable payments at their present worth, still survives and
would be applicable under the facts presented in Revenue Ruling
83-46.85
Another case supporting the open transaction theory advocated
in the drilling cases"' is North American Oil Consolidated v. Bur-
nett.8" This case determined that where the proceeds from oil pro-
duction are contingent and the taxpayer has no control over their
receipt, the proceeds are not includible in gross income. While the
(5th Cir. 1938).
82. 283 U.S. 404 (1931). This case established that where the consideration in the sale
of stock was based upon the amount of iron ore mined, the value of the consideration received
could not be determined with "fair certainty," gain is not realized until the aggregate pay-
ments received exceeded the taxpayer's basis in the stock, after which recovery of basis, the
taxpayer was to then report as income the payments as received.
83. Rev. Rul. 58-402, 1958-2 C.B. 15 (emphasis added).
84. This practice has been nearly abolished partly as a result of these recent code
changes: I.R.C. § 453(j)(2) (P-H 1984); Temp. Treas. Reg § 15A.453-1(c) (1980).
85. See, e.g., Vestal v. United States, 498 F.2d 487, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9407(8th Cir. 1974).
86. See supra notes 76-81.
87. 286 U.S. 417 (1932). In this case, proceeds from the production of some oil proper-
ties in the hands of a receiver were not includible in the taxpayer's gross income until they
were paid over to the taxpayer under the claim of right doctrine.
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case dealt with oil proceeds held by a receiver in litigation, the rea-
soning seems analogous to a situation where a service provider re-
ceives a conveyance of oil or production payments or an overriding
royalty interest, particularly where he has no control over the
production.
Logan and North American Oil Consolidated are two cases
among many where the courts have not required the inclusion into
gross income of future payments that are speculative or indefinite.88
The employer-employee contingent compensation cases offer an
interesting analogy to the contributor of services in oil and gas prop-
erty.8 ' Certainly, the office employee who is the object of a declared
but unpaid bonus has a valuable contract right which a willing
buyer could purchase at a discounted amount based on the nature of
the contingency, and the financial strength and sales history of the
declaring company. Why is the value of such a bonus not includible
in the gross income of the employee when the bonus is declared?
The IRS might distinguish the case of the oil property service con-
tributor from the employee with the declared bonus, by suggesting
that in the later case Treasury Regulation § 1.451-1(a) 90 controls
and that there is no constructive receipt of income in the year the
bonus is declared. While the regulation might apply, that does not
alter that the economic reality of each case which is arguably the
same. The employee has a valuable contract right which he may
transfer to a willing buyer for consideration as soon as it is declared.
The service contributor may have a valuable property right which he
can sell when it is received. Revenue Ruling 83-46," however, re-
88. Examples of other cases include those where insurance brokers argued unsuccess-
fully that renewal commissions were earned by them when the insurance policy was first is-
sued. However, the IRS argued, and the courts hold, that renewal commissions are includible
when the premiums are paid, because the commissions are contingent until received. See Ed-
wards v. Keith, 231 F.2d 110 (2d Cir. 1931); see also Woods v. Lewellyn, 252 F.2d 106
(1918); Seattle First Nat'l Bank v. Henrickson, 24 F. Supp. 256, 38-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9466 (W.D. Wash. 1938).
89. Kahn v. United States, 81-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9187 (W.D. N.C. 1981). In
this case, a bonus declared in one year and payable in the next, was not includible in the gross
income of an officer/controlling shareholder where the company policy historically was to de-
clare one year and pay the next. It is interesting that the IRS did not argue the applicability of
I.R.C. § 83 (P-H 1984) in that case. See also Rev. Rul. 75-180, 1975-1 C.B. 142. The IRS
here ruled that a senior officer/major stockholder of a corporation did not have to include in
income in the year declared, a bonus based on a percentage of gross sales normally calculated
and paid the following year. Again, the IRS did not allude to I.R.C. § 83 (P-H 1984).
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.451(a) (1960). This section requires inclusion in gross income in the
year gains, profits, or income are either actually or constructively received.
91. Rev. Rul. 75-180, 1975-1 C.B. 142. This ruling requires income to be included
when it is actually or constructively received, unless the taxpayer had a different method of
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quires a different tax result, and denies the deferral to the oil prop-
erty service contributor, while Revenue Ruling 75-180"2 allows a
deferral to an employee. 98
A. Pool of Capital Doctrine Affirmed by the Case Law
Perhaps the strongest affirmation of the pool of capital theory,
as articulated in G.C.M. 22730 is the oil well driller case of Com-
missioner v. Rowan Drilling Co.9' While the issue before the court
was different than the issue here95 the court recognized the service
provider's services as an investment in the property.
It is no longer open to doubt that the ownership of oil in place
is a capital asset, and that the acquisition price of the asset,
whether paid in cash or services, is a capital investment that
may not be treated as a business expense for income tax pur-
poses but must be recouped by depletion deductions from gross
income. 90
The court also affirmed that incurrence of costs or a cost basis was
not a precondition to the availability of the percentage depletion de-
duction to be taken by the driller. All that is required is that the
taxpayer has an economic property interest in the oil.97
Another case which recognized the unique circumstances of
making a valuable contribution to the acquisition, exploration, or de-
velopment of an oil and gas property was Rocky Mountain Develop-
accounting.
92. 1975-1 C.B. 142.
93. Another situation where future income is not required to be included in income
arises when an independent contractor enters into a contract that provides that owner can
retain contract payments upon completion of the contract to incur performance of a guarantee
or warranty. See also Comm'r v. Cleveland Trinidad Paving Co., 62 F.2d 85, U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 1 1006 (6th Cir. 1938). In this case, the court held that the taxpayer did not have to
include in income retention payments in the year the contract was completed, because payment
was contingent. This case, however, may have been the type of case to which I.R.C. § 83 (P-H
1984) might clearly apply, and in essence achieve the same result as the court.
94. 130 F.2d 62, 42-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9628 (5th Cir. 1942), affd, 44 B.T.A.
189.
95. I.R.C. § 162 (P-H 1984). The issue in Rowan was whether the drilling company
taxpayer could take a § 162 deduction as well as a depletion deduction by virtue of the eco-
nomic interest it received in the transaction.
96. 130 F.2d 64, 42-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 11 9268, at 829 (5th Cir. 1942) (emphasis
added); see also Lee v. Comm'r, 126 F.2d 825, 42-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9375 (5th Cir.
1942). Here the taxpayer/oil well driller purchased oil payments and also received oil pay-
ments for drilling wells. He attempted to deduct his costs against production, but the court
held that he acquired an economic interest in the oil bearing property, and thus he was re-
quired to recover his costs through depletion.
97. Id.
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ment Co. v. Commissioner,9 8 which concerned a taxpayer who con-
tributed oil well equipment to the development of an oil and gas
property in exchange for an economic interest in it. As in the well
driller cases, the court held that the present value of future payments
was not presently includible in gross income due to the speculative
nature of the payments."
Another line of cases has developed a corollary rule of law to
the principle that a service provider to the pool of capital need not
presently include in gross income the present value of future pay-
ments from an economic interest. Early on, the IRS attempted to tax
both sides of the transaction, not only the service contributor, but
also the transferor of the economic interest.1 00 The Service viewed
the transferor as selling a part of his interest for services, equipment,
or cash. For example, in one case the IRS attempted to tax as in-
come to the transferor, the value of the services provided by a well
driller. The court, however, held that because the driller made an
investment in the pool of capital, the value of the wells were not
includible in the gross income of the taxpayer.' A similar conclu-
sion was made in Transcalifornia Oil Co. v. Commissioner'"2 and
Rawco Inc. v. Commissioner.' In these cases, the investors joined
with the service contributors and with the operator/owner of the
working interest. The operator gave the investor and the service pro-
vider production certificates which meant that each contributor could
share in production to obtain his return on investment. In each case
the IRS attempted to tax the operator on the theory that the trans-
fers amounted to sales of its interest. The court, however, held that
the operator was in fact a trustee holding funds to be used exclu-
sively for the development of the properties in question in each case
and as such was not includible in the gross income of the operation.
The court also held that each contributor was separately entitled to
his share of the production gross income for depletion purposes be-
98. 38 B.T.A. 1303 (1938). Here, the IRS again asserted that the present value of fu-
ture payments should be included in the taxpayer's gross income although the economic inter-
est was exchanged for equipment contributed to the development of the property.
99. "The consideration received by petitioner for its sales of equipment during 1932 and
1933, being the right to receive such contingent oil payments, was not the equivalent of cash
because the promise to make such oil payments had no definite ascertainable fair market
value." Id. at 1305-06.
100. Laster v. Comm'r, 43 B.T.A. 159 (1940), modified on other grounds, 128 F.2d 4,
42-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9425 (5th Cir. 1942).
101. "The lessees here received nothing more than completed wells, the cost of which
constituted the investment of a third party for a right to share in production." Id. at 174.
102. 37 B.T.A. 119 (1938).
103. 37 B.T.A. 128 (1938).
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cause each was a participant in the pool of capital.1""
B. Cases Rejecting Pool of Capital Treatment for Certain Service
Providers
Another group of service providers connected with oil and gas
properties are attorneys and accountants. Several cases involve the
issue as to whether the value of an economic property interest in the
oil received for services contributed by the attorney should be in-
cluded in his income in the year the interest is received. 08 These
cases serve as a limit to the pool of capital theory. Commentators
who have reviewed the personal services cases and the pool of capital
theory suggest that there are several tests as to whether the service
investor falls within the pool of capital. The most important test be-
ing that the services must be contributed to the "acquisition, explora-
tion or development" of the oil and gas property. 00 If the attorney's
services are in connection with quieting title, they do not fall within
the purview of "acquisition, exploration, or development" of the oil
104. See Transcalifornia Oil Co., Ltd. v. Comm'r, 37 B.T.A. 119, 126-27 (1938).
105. Massey v. Comm'r, 143 F.2d 429, 44-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9384 (5th Cir.
1944). In this case, attorney for a contingent fee of one-half of the interest of his client in an
oil and gas property, proceeded to obtain a determination of the validity of a lease in a Louisi-
ana guardianship case where the ward signed the lease before an insanity determination. The
court held that the attorney had to include in income, the production proceeds accumulating as
well as the present value of the economic interest, when the litigation was successfully con-
cluded. In Walls v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 347 (10th Cir. 1932), an attorney taxpayer received one-
third of the working interest for "professional services," and did not indicate whether the
services were performed in the acquisition of the property in which he acquired the interest.
The court held that the attorney had to include in income the value of the interest, but he was
allowed a deduction for depletion. In Allen v. Comm'r, 5 T.C. 1232 (1905), an attorney re-
ceived contingent fees of an economic interest in an oil and gas property and the court held
that he had to include in income the accumulation of proceeds during the pendancy of the
action as well as the present worth of the interest he acquired (distinguishing Dearing v.
Comm'r, 102 F.2d 91, 39-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9344 (5th Cir. 1939)). In Blake v.
Comm'r, 20 T.C. 721 (1953), an attorney received a percentage of the working interest in an
oil and gas property for his services in quieting title to the property. The court held that the
value of the interest should have been included in the tax year when it was acquired, but for
the running of the statute of limitations.
106. K. MILLER, MILLER'S OIL AND GAS FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION §§ 2-16, 23-
33 (wherein the author sets forth six requirements); see also Shelton, The Taxation of Oil and
Gas Interests Received in Payment for Property or Services, The Fifth Annual Institute on
Oil and Gas Law and Taxation as it Affects the Oil and Gas Industry, SOUTHWESTERN
LEGAL FOUNDATION 440 (1954), wherein the author prescribed three requirements to fall
within the ambit of G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214; see also IRS Letter Ruling 8137006
(July 23, 1980), wherein the IRS expressed its view that services performed under the pool of
capital theory covered by G.C.M. 22730, are those prior to discovery of oil or gas. Also, the
property in which the interest as confined must be the same property to which the services are
contributed.
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and gas property. Furthermore, by the time the attorney's interests
in the properties vested, the properties were developed, producing
and, therefore, their values were ascertainable. No case has yet been
decided wherein the attorney furnished legal services for the acquisi-
tion, exploration or development of a specific nondeveloped prop-
erty.107 However, it would seem that attorney services would directly
benefit the pool of capital and should not be excluded from "tax
free" treatment.
C. Other Cases Limiting the Pool of Capital Doctrine
In recent years, long after the pool of capital theory had become
well-entrenched in administrative practice, the decisions in several
cases put limitations on the pool of capital doctrine and could by
implication provide support for the position taken in Revenue Rul-
ing 83-46008 In each case, the court held that the taxpayer was re-
quired to presently include in gross income, the value of the property
or interest in property received as compensation for services ren-
dered. Each case, however, is clearly distinguishable from the situa-
tion where a taxpayer invests in services in the acquisition, explora-
tion or development of the property for a share of property, and
seeks return on his investment from the operation and production of
the property.
United States v. Frazel' 9 is clearly distinguishable. Here the
taxpayer was to receive an interest in hydrocarbon producing
properties after certain investors recovered their investments. 'But
before they fully recovered their investments, the investors formed
what the court perceived to be a partnership. They then formed a
corporation, and transferred either a partnership interest or corpo-
rate stock to Frazell instead of an economic interest in the property.
The conveyance of stock or a partnership interest clearly transcends
107. Rev. Rul. 54-84, 1954-1 C.B. 284, perhaps provides yet another distinction, for
therein, Massey, supra and Wells, supra note 105, were distinguished by the IRS. Therein, B,
a lawyer, joined a partnership with a venture capitalist, a lease superintendent, and a drilling
superintendent and they contracted to acquire, explore, and develop oil and gas properties.
The IRS designated the lawyer as a true bona fide partner and not an employee or agent as in
Massey and Wells and, thus, the leases held in A's name were partnership assets and not A's
individual assets.
108. K. MILLER, supra note 106, at 1 2-16, 22-3; United States v. Frazell, 335 F.2d
487, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9684 (5th Cir. 1964); James A. Lewis Engineering, Inc. v.
Comm'r, 339 F.2d 706, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9122 (5th Cir. 1964); Diamond v.
Comm'r, 492 F.2d 286, 74-1 U.S. Tax Gas. (CCH) 1 9501 (7th Cir. 1974); Vestal v. United
States, 498 F.2d 487, 74-2 U.S. Tax Gas. 1 9501 (8th Cir. 1974).
109. 339 F.2d 706, 65-1 U.S. Tax Gas. (CH) 1 9501 (7th Cir. 1974).
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the scope of the pool of capital doctrine which requires an invest-
ment of services in property.110
In James A. Lewis Engineering, Inc. v. Commissioner,"1 the
Fifth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's holding that the services here
were beyond the acquisition, exploration or development stages;
rather the services performed were in connection with the installa-
tion of a water flood program which is normally introduced after the
primary production phase has commenced. Of concern to scholars of
the pool of capital theory was the dictum in this case, which sug-
gested that if the issue of the pool of capital doctrine-an exception
to the section 61 requirements of inclusion of property as compensa-
tion-were squarely before the court, the court would have to take a
long hard look to determine whether such an exemption existed at
all. The language is ironic in that it was uttered by the very court
that was operative in the formulation of the pool of capital doctrine
in the Rowan decision years earlier.
Finally, the taxpayer in Vestal, was to receive an economic in-
terest for the geological services he contributed to the development of
hydrocarbon-bearing property after the investors recovered their in-
vestment. Before they fully recovered their investment, the investors
sold the property and paid the taxpayer cash for his contingent share
in the property. The court treated this as compensation income de-
spite the taxpayer's argument that he had recognized compensation
income when he received the right in an earlier year.'1 2 The court
suggested that the contract was executory, initially speculative, and
had no certainty that the taxpayer would ever receive anything in the
future and was, therefore, not income in the earlier year but in the
later year when he was paid. Perhaps, the result would have been
substantially different if the taxpayer had received a vested interest
initially before he performed the services, and then looked to his re-
turn from production which he helped create, and not to the sale of
the property."'
110. See Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1) (1960) (which provides "to the extent that any of
the partners gives up any part of his right to be repaid his contribution (as distinguished from
a share in partnership profits) in favor of another partner as compensation for services (or in
satisfaction of an obligation), section 721 does not apply." Id.; see also Priddy v. Comm'r, 43
B.T.A. 18 (1940)) (the taxpayer performed services in organizing and incorporating a com-
pany for the purpose of acquiring and holding oil property. He had shares of the corporation
as compensation and the court required him to include the value of the stock in gross income).
111. 339 F.2d 706. 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9684 (5th Cir. 1964).
112. The statute of limitations or inclusion of the property right to income had expired
during the year before the right vested.
113. For a further discussion, see infra Logan, note 162 and accompanying text.
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In view of the cases, Revenue Ruling 83-46 should not summa-
rily require the taxpayers in each of the three situations presented to
include in gross income the present value of an economic interest
received for their services. Rather, proper application of the princi-
ples of the cases would dictate a detailed analysis of each situation in
light of the existing case law and administrative practices. For exam-
ple, there have been circumstances where the services of a promoter,
attorney, or employee of a corporation contributed to a hydrocarbon-
bearing property have been of equal necessity and value as the ser-
vices of the driller, welder, or geologist in the success of the acquisi-
tion, exploration and development of an oil and gas property. 114 The
cases present some clearly identifiable principles, which if followed,
should provide the tax deferral envisioned in G.C.M. 22730.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE
A. G.C.M. 22730
For several years following G.C.M. 22730, very little written
direction emanated from the Revenue Service regarding the pool of
capital doctrine as it relates to service contributions. Then Revenue
Ruling 77-176"' and several private letter rulings followed, some
favorable to the taxpayer, and some not. Finally, in 1983, the IRS
issued Revenue Ruling 83-46 which officially altered its position.
Perhaps this change of position was forecast in an IRS handbook
pertaining to audits of oil and gas property owners and operators.1"
The handbook directs agents who are examining oil and gas partner-
ships and drilling ventures to carefully scrutinize the underlying
agreements for interests conveyed in exchange for services. It then
points out that a legal problem will be encountered because G.C.M.
22730, while not revoked, is unclear. The handbook states: "It has
not been revoked although it seems to have been partially superseded
by the 1954 Code, case law and the 1969 Tax Reform Act." ' The
handbook then recommends requesting technical advice if the income
adjustment is substantial. The handbook refers to the Diamond,
114. See, e.g., I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8047005 (July 24, 1980) (a promoter took an over-
riding royalty interest and a reversionary working interest after payout in promoting, as-
signing, and developing oil and gas property and was held to be contributing to the pool of
capital). But see Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 16.
115. 1977-1 C.B. 78
116. Internal Revenue Manual-Audit, (CCH) 7271-25, No. 242-244 (April 24,
1981).
117. Id.
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James A. Lewis Engineering, Inc. and Frazell cases.' 18 Finally,
however, the handbook does confirm the result in Revenue Ruling
77-176."9
B. Other Rulings
Revenue Ruling 77-176 considers two overlapping concepts: (1)
the pool of capital concept involving service contributors; and (2) the
concept of the carried interest. As to the pool of capital concept, the
ruling resolves that when a well driller receives an economic interest
in the very well site where he contributes his services, he need not
take into income presently, the value of the interest received. How-
ever, if he also receives for the same service interest from another
property, such as the property surrounding but excluding the well
site, the interest from the other property is treated as compensation
for services. To the extent of its value, the surrounding property is
presently includible in income. In support of its position, the IRS
refers to G.C.M. 22730.120 As to the carried interest concept, be-
cause the entire working interest of the drill site was conveyed to the
driller until payout subject to a retained overriding royalty interest,
the IRS said that the arrangement was a good carried interest and
that the driller could deduct one hundred percent of his intangible
drilling expenses. With respect to the transferor, to the extent the
transfer of the drill site fell within the concept of the pool of capital
doctrine and was a good carried interest, no sale of the interest re-
sulted. However, since the transfer of the property exclusive of the
drill site was neither a carried interest, nor was it covered by the
pool of capital doctrine, that transfer was treated as a sale by the
IRS.121
During the 1970's and 1980's the Revenue Service issued a se-
ries of private letter rulings which defined those types of service con-
tributors likely to be members of the pool of capital club. First, the
IRS, on two occasions, ruled that independent geologists who provide
services in prospecting, locating and preparing prospects for explora-
tion are entitled to "tax free""' receipt of an economic interest in
118. Id.; see supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text.
119. 1977-1 C.B. 78.
120. Id. at 78-79.
121. The services contributed in this case benefitted only the drill site and not the prop-
erty outside the drill site.
122. The IRS in its private rulings uses the concept "tax free." However, the term "tax
free" in this context is a misnomer because the taxpayers have to report as income production
proceeds when received. Perhaps, "tax deferred" is a better description.
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the property for which they provide the beneficial service.?2
In 1980, a second IRS ruling held that overriding royalty inter-
ests and twenty percent reversionary operating interests reserved by
a corporate oil and gas investment program promoter in considera-
tion for contributed services of finding and acquiring the properties
in which it received its economic interest, was not presently includi-
ble in gross income.12 4 However, because of the opposite conclusion
regarding the first factual situation prescribed in Revenue Ruling
83-46, the same result would not be afforded if the ruling request
were submitted today.
In a third ruling favorable to the taxpayer, the IRS held that
where a group of independent oil companies organized to find and
develop hydrocarbon-bearing properties in the North Sea, and one of
them was selected to and did contribute services as a locator and
developer of properties and as an operator, the economic interest re-
ceived by that oil company was "tax free" as a contribution of its
services to the pool of capital.'2
On the other hand, there have been some rulings that have been
unfavorable to the taxpayer particularly in the area of employee in-
centive programs. For example, in one private ruling the chief exec-
utive officer (C.E.O.) of a private corporation was instrumental in
initiating an incentive program to increase competition among em-
ployees. The concept was that the employees would share in overrid-
ing royalty interests of properties they developed. Later the board
resolved that the C.E.O. should also receive overrides as incentives.
The IRS reasoned that the present value of the interest an employee
received had to be included in his gross income because services must
be contributed to the very property from which the economic interest
derives in order to come within the scope of the pool of capital the-
ory of G.C.M. 22730.18 The IRS held that the C.E.O. did not pro-
vide services to specific properties in that his duties included super-
vising other employees and participating in policy decisions which
are generally not of a type which should receive "tax free" treat-
ment. In two other private rulings, the Revenue Service reached the
123. See, e.g., I.R.S. Letter Ruling 6801029370A (Jan. 2, 1968) In this letter ruling,
the geologist served in two capacities, as president of the company which held title and oper-
ated the properties, and as an independent geologist who found the target properties and who
in his capacity as geologist, received an economic interest in the nature of an individual rever-
sionary working interest.
124. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8047005 (July 24, 1980).
125. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8137006 (July 23, 1981).
126. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8014024 (Dec. 28, 1979).
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same result.'27
These three private rulings are consistent with the IRS position
taken in the factual situation number three of Revenue Ruling 83-
46. This position, however, is somewhat inconsistent with the posi-
tion taken by the IRS in its 1968 Private Letter Ruling involving the
independent geologist.'2 8 There the geologist was an officer of the
corporation that operated the property, yet he received overriding
royalties on properties which he found for investors and for the cor-
poration. Nevertheless, the position may be justified in that case be-
cause the geologist acted in a dual capacity, as an officer on the one
hand, and as a consultant on the other.
While private letter rulings cannot be relied on by taxpayers
other than those who are subjects of the rulings, they offer insights
into IRS policy and position on issues. The letter rulings cited above
offer some important considerations which reaffirm and augment the
rationale of G.C.M. 22730, and they should be taken into account
when structuring a transaction for an oil or gas property service
contributor.
First, it should be abundantly clear from the rulings previously
cited that the services must be contributed to the specific property
from which the economic interest is transferred in return. 29 The
concept was said to be equivalent to G.C.M. 22730's requirement
that contributed services must be used on the specific property from
which the economic interest is to be transferred to the cash
investor.30
The "specific property" rule was the basis of denying the "tax
free" treatment to overriding royalty interests received by the chief
executive officer, exploration manager, and land manager who are
each employees of close corporations. 8 ' The question that arises is
can a corporate employee ever contribute services to the pool of capi-
127. In one case, the taxpayer was a land manager of a corporation and in the other, the
taxpayer was an exploration manager. The IRS held that neither contributed services exclu-
sively to the properties from which they received their overriding royalties; rather their services
were generally performed on all properties owned or operated by the company including
properties in which they could not participate. Therefore, each had to include in gross income
the value of the interest when received. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8152001 (Dec. 28, 1979) (involv-
ing the land manager); I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8146006 (undated) (involving the exploration
manager).
128. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 6801029370A (Jan. 2, 1968); see supra note 123 and accom-
panying text.
129. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8014024 (Dec. 28, 1978); I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8152001 (Dec.
28, 1979); I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8146006 (Dec. 28, 1981).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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tal and receive "tax free" treatment under G.C.M. 22730? As a re-
sult of these private letter rulings, and particularly Revenue Ruling
83-46, the IRS is apparently signaling that it will oppose "tax free"
treatment in almost every employee incentive plan. This is so be-
cause the description of the duties of the employees in those rulings
fit the job descriptions of most of their counterparts in other corpora-
tions. However, I.R.S. Letter Ruling 680102937A"3 2 suggests a solu-
tion. There the taxpayer acted in a dual capacity-independent ge-
ologist and a officer of a corporation. Perhaps, for some corporations
desiring the contribution of its employee's services to the pool of cap-
ital on a specific property, such corporations might describe the du-
ties to be contributed by the employees to the specific property as
being outside the scope of their regular employment for which they
receive normal compensation. In short, such employees would serve
in dual capacities. To insure that a dual capacity relationship exists
between the parties, an agreement should be drafted to clearly delin-
eate the services to be contributed to the specific properties from
which the employee will receive the overriding royalty interest.1 33
However, the suggestion may prove cumbersome for most employer/
employee arrangements." 4
As a corollary to the above rule, Revenue Ruling 77-176' sug-
gests that a specific tax treatment should result when services are
contributed to a specific property, but economic interests are con-
veyed to the contributor from the specific property as well as from
other property. That ruling held the interest conveyed from the
property other than the specific property was compensation income
to the service contributor. The transferor of the economic interest, on
the other hand, is treated as having made a sale of that interest.
Next, the IRS is not concerned with the formality of the eco-
nomic interest transferred, in that it can be in any form as long as it
132. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 680102937A (Jan. 2, 1968); see also I.R.S. Letter Ruling
8137006 (July 23, 1980).
133. See Hall, Contribution of Services to the Pool of Capital: Defining the Boundaries,
30 OIL & GAs TAX Q. 442, 452 (1982) (as an alternative, it is suggested that employers may
wish to devise overriding royalty plans utilizing the type of restrictions that are used in con-
junction with restricted stock employee incentive plans); see also Glancy, Compensating Key
Employees in the Oil and Gas Business, 33 INST. OIL & GAs L. & TAX'N 369, 375-78 (1982)
(examples of employee compensation planning devices utilizing "substantial risk of forfeiture"
techniques to gain tax deferral under § 83 (P-H 1984) are provided).
134. This would involve a substantial administrative burden on the employer in the
form of documenting specific activity expenses and costs to specific properties when the em-
ployee may be responsible for many hundreds of properties.
135. 1971-1 C.B. 77, 78-79.
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is an economic interest. Thus, I.R.S. Letter Ruling 680102937A"'
held that the interest could even be a reversionary working interest
and need not necessarily be evidenced by a formal conveyancing deed
so long as the initial agreement specifying the rights and duties of
the parties clearly describes the interest set aside for the service con-
tributor. This reaffirms the concept that was originally set out in
G.C.M. 22730.187
The next concept articulated in the rulings is that the only in-
vestment into the pool of capital required is that of services. Personal
services need not be accompanied with a cash investment or equip-
ment. Thus, the pure services of a geologist qualify for the pool of
capital investment affording "tax free" treatment." Revenue Ruling
83-46 apparently attempts to draw this line on qualifying and non-
qualifying services contributed to the pool of capital.' 9 However, the
question arises that if pure services of a geologist can qualify, what
then is the justification or rationale which supports the decision in
Revenue Ruling 83-46 that the services of the promoter, attorney, or
chief executive officer are less important to the successful exploration
of the pool of capital than the services of the geologist? There is no
logical distinction between the types of services and their importance
to the pool of capital. Again, it is often the skill and services of the
attorney or promoter that make it possible for the geologist to make
his contribution to the pool of capital.
The next concept which reaffirms and augments the meaning of
G.C.M. 22730 is that services contributed up to the point of drilling
prior to discovery of oil and gas qualify for the pool of capital treat-
ment.140 The IRS selection of this limitation in the private letter rul-
ings presumably are intended to give further meaning to the words,
"for use in developing the leased property in return for agreements
to make stated payments out of a share of the oil," found in G.C.M.
22730. "1 This amplification was probably necessary because James
A. Lewis Engineering, Inc.," 2 which denied pool of capital treat-
136. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 680102937A (Jan. 2, 1968).
137. G.C.M. 22730, 1941-1 C.B. 214, 222.
138. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8129006 (March 30, 1981); I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8137006
(July 23, 1980).
139. Apparently, the services of: 1) an attorney, 2) a corporate promoter of oil and gas
syndications, and 3) a corporate executive, do not qualify as services for IRS purposes.
140. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8137006 (July 23, 1981); see also I.R.S. Letter Ruling
8047005 (July 24, 1980) (emphasis added).
141. 1941-1 C.B. 214, 221.
142. James A. Lewis Engineering, Inc. v. Comm'r, 339 F.2d 706, 65-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9122 (5th Cir. 1964).
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ment to services contributed to a production phase improvement on
oil and gas property. Thus, services contributed beyond the develop-
ment phase, will receive questionable treatment under the pool of
capital concept.
Another concept reiterated in the letter rulings is that services
contributed should be "performed prior to the value of the property
becoming known."""3 While G.C.M. 22730 does not cite as authority
for its opinion any of the well driller cases unsuccessfully litigated by
the Revenue Service in the 1930's,"" it appears that the phrase
"performed prior to the value of the property becoming known" in
the letter rulings manifests the IRS's continued awareness of those
cases. The principle that when the value of a property interest is too
speculative to ascertain fair market value it is not includible in gross
income, is one that has carried into recent times.1 5 This requirement
serves as the factor which distinguishes the nontaxability of the eco-
nomic interest of the contribution of services to the pool of capital,
from the taxability of the partnership interest received by the tax-
payers in Diamond,"4 Frazell'47 and Vestal.148
Two final observations regarding the letter rulings are notewor-
thy. The first is that the IRS initially manifested concern about the
application of section 83 to the service contribution issue in 1981.
Prior to 1981 no written material emanating from the IRS referred
to section 83 in the context of the taxability of an economic interest
received by a service contributor to the pool of capital. A period of
twelve years elapsed from the date of its enactment until the first
mention of section 83 in that context in I.R.S. Letter Ruling
8129006149 and in the new oil and gas audit handbook. 50 During
143. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8129006 (Mar. 30, 1981); see also I.R.S. Letter Ruling
8137006 (July 23, 1980).
144. Dearing v. Comm'r, 102 F.2d 91, 39-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9344 (5th Cir.
1939); Comm'r v. Edwards Drilling Co., 95 F.2d 719, 38-1 U.S. Tax Gas. (CCH) 9211
(5th cir. 1938); Cook Drilling Co. v. Comm'r, 38 B.T.A. 291 (1938); see also Burnett v.
Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
145. See, e.g., Vestal v. United States, 498 F.2d 487, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9407
(8th Cir. 1974).
146. Diamond v. Comm'r, 492 F.2d 286, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9306 (7th Cir.
1974) (the value of a partnership interest was imputed from the sale of the property shortly
after receipt of the partnership interest).
147. United States v. Frazell, 335 F. 2d 487, 64-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9684 (5th
Cir. 1964) (contingencies removed from the contract and stock were transferred when value of
the property was known). See also supra notes 109-110 and accompanying text.
148. Vestal v. United States, 498 F.2d 487, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9407 (8th
Cir. 1974) (contingencies in the taxpayer's contract were removed after value of the property
was known and taxpayer received cash for his interest).
149. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8129006 (March 30, 1981).
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this twelve-year period, the IRS appeared to follow the administra-
tive practice it had followed since 1941 starting with G.C.M. 22730.
Second, the IRS continues to acknowledge in the letter rulings
that if the contributed services fall within the pool of capital theory
as described under G.C.M. 22730, then neither sections 61 nor 83
apply to that property transfer."'
C. Revenue Ruling 83-46 is not the Solution
A review of the administrative activity of the Revenue Service
over the past decade, suggests that Revenue Ruling 83-46... is the
IRS's attempt to limit the types of services that qualify for pool of
capital treatment. In this regard the IRS recently stated: Because
there has been little guidance from the courts on the scope of the
doctrine, restrictive interpretations are justified.15
In Revenue Ruling 83-46 the Revenue Service excluded from
pool of capital treatment: (1) the corporate promoter of oil and gas
development programs; (2) the attorney who provides legal services
in the acquisition of properties; and (3) the corporate employee who
arranges financing for the corporation's acquisition of oil and gas
properties and oversees their operation.
The difficulty in arbitrarily drawing the line in this manner, is
in the formulation of a sensible and workable approach to the inclu-
sion and exclusion of services from the pool of capital treatment. For
example, why is the driller more valuable to the success of a project
than the attorney, where but for the attorney's services the project
may have never been started nor the pool of capital formed? Does
inclusion or exclusion depend on the classification of skill, that is,
whether the skills of a driller are involved or those of an attorney?
150. Internal Revenue Manual Audit (CCH) 1 7271-26, No. 242-244 (Apr. 24, 1981).
151. I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8129006 (Mar. 30, 1981); see also I.R.S. Letter Ruling
8137006 (July 23, 1980); I.R.S. Letter Ruling 8047005 (July 24, 1980) (which, however, is
probably overruled by Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 16).
152. Rev. Rul. 83-46, 1983-1 C.B. 16.
153. Manganaris, Background Information Note, supra note 2 (emphasis added). The
IRS added:
In support of this approach, it is noted that in James A. Lewis Engineering,
Inc. v. Comm'r, 339 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1964), the court in holding that the
taxpayer's services in connection with "production" activities were outside the
scope of G.C.M. 22730, in dictum stated at 709, that "unless a careful analysis
of the reasons underlying the issuing of G.C.M. 22730 compelled it, the court
would have great difficulty accepting a construction of the code that would fly in
the face of the tax laws to the effect that compensation for services must be
returned as part of gross income."
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Or, is it the type of service being contributed by the driller or the
attorney? For example, well drillers have been known to contribute
a variety of different services to the pool of capital. In one instance
he may provide very superficial and ministerial services such as pro-
viding the drilling rig and the crew in exchange for an oil pay-
ment.1"4 On the other hand, the well driller may provide a "turn-
key" package including not only the rig and the crew, but also the
supervision of the drilling and all of the supplies and equipment.
This was the case in Revenue Ruling 77-176,15 in which the driller
committed to drill, complete, and equip the well. The question is
whether the IRS had both situations in mind when it issued its opin-
ion in G.C.M. 22730. In the first instance, the driller's cash or
equipment investment in the project would be minimal. Is "tax free"
receipt of the economic interest by the driller in the first instance any
more justified -than in the case of the attorney who negotiates with
land owners to obtain the minimum cost, structures the minimum
tax cost for the project, and in drafting documents, minimizes legal
risks and costs to the extent of rendering the project legally and eco-
nomically feasible? Mindful of the national policy considerations of
fostering competition among oil companies and increasing domestic
exploration, development, and production of oil and gas, one must
question whether the services of the corporate promoter in locating
worthy hydrocarbon-bearing prospects and then obtaining the capital
necessary by finding interested investors, is any less important to the
national policy than the well drillers who merely provide the rig and
drill the hole.
As a result of the criticism from taxpayers across the nation,"'
the IRS announced that it will review and clarify its decision in Rev-
enue Ruling 83-46.157 In response, the Independent Petroleum Asso-
ciation of America submitted to the IRS its suggestion for a modifi-
cation of Revenue Ruling 83-46."8 The Association has imposed a
154. The services provided in this situation would be comparable to the "day-rate"
drilling contract for cash compensation, wherein the drilling company provides the drilling rig
and the crew and is compensated in cash at an hourly or daily rate. He assumes none of the
risks of the operation and provides none of the materials. Normally, the owner of the working
interest supervises the drilling operation and contracts with, and obtains all of the supplies and
equipment for the drilling operation. Telephone interview with Harold W. Berholf, geologist
from Sacramento, Cal. (June 11, 1984).
155. Rev. Rul. 77-176, 1977-1 C.B. 77.
156. See supra note 9.
157. Letter from John F. Chapton, Asst. Sec. (Tax Policy), Dept. Treas. to John
Tower, U.S. Senator, (Dec. 19, 1983) (stating that the IRS is considering comments on Rev.
Rul. 83-46).
158. Letter from H.B. Scoggins, Jr., Gen. Counsel, Indep. Petroleum Ass'n. of America
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test which determines whether the type of service in question is "es-
sential for the acquisition, exploration or development of the prop-
erty." Accompanying the test are examples of services that are essen-
tial and those that are nonessential and therefore do not qualify for
"tax free" treatment.1 The approach suggested by the Association
more equitably distinguishes and acknowledges services which are
essential to the acquisition, exploration and development of oil and
gas properties, in that it recognizes those services which implement
the national policy.
Most likely, the IRS has limited the types of services eligible for
pool of capital treatment to prevent the abuse that would develop if
every service provider attempted to qualify for pool of capital treat-
ment no matter how remotely connected his services were to the ac-
quisition, exploration or development of an oil and gas property.
The oil and gas industry has existed for at least a century. Ex-
isting for almost as long is the practice of conveying an economic
interest in exchange for the contribution of services. The fact that
this practice has continued for so long supports the notion that valid
business motives are involved. History suggests, therefore, that this
practice existed for valid business purposes and not just for tax-moti-
vated reasons. Where the type of service can be demonstrated as be-
ing accepted in exchange for an economic interest, as matter of his-
torical oil industry practice, it should be afforded deferred income
status. A "valid business purpose" test would be an appropriate ve-
hicle to determine which services should receive pool of capital
treatment.
D. Validation
Revenue Ruling 83-46 is inadequate as it does not resolve the
speculative valuation issue raised in the early cases 1" which were a
to John E. Chapton, Asst. Sec. (Tax Policy), Dept. Treas. (Feb. 3, 1984) along with Draft of
Proposed Ruling to Amplify Rev. Rul. 83-46.
159. For example, a promoter merely finds investors and reviews geological data with
them. Forecasts do not qualify. However, if the promoter conducts an independent evaluation
of the prospects and based on his independent evaluation, and he seeks out and obtains inves-
tors, his services qualify. In the case of an attorney, if he merely examines claims to title and
drafts documents within the parameters defined by the oil companies, then his services do not
qualify. On the other hand, if he negotiates with landowners and performs services of examin-
ing claims to title and drafts documents based on the negotiation, his services will qualify. The
Association also provides examples of qualifying and nonqualifying services of the corporate
employee, geologist, employee, well driller, independent geologist, and independent petroleum
landman.
160. See supra notes 76-80, 82.
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prelude to G.M.C. 22730. The inclusion into gross income of the
present value of an economic interest continues to present the same
valuation problem today as it did forty years ago. How do you value
an oil and gas property that has not yet been developed? The pre-
dominant valuation method used in the industry is sometimes re-
ferred to as the analytical engineering method of appraisal. 1'e In or-
der to use this valuation technique, several assumptions have to be
made on an undeveloped property that may or may not be correct.
For example, the geologist or engineer must calculate the estimated
reserves that can be recovered with reasonable certainty under the
given economic and technological conditions. If there has been little
or no prior production from the subject property, such an estimate
amounts to nothing more than an educated guess. Additionally, the
valuation method requires estimating a decline curve which is neces-
sary in determining the economic life of the property as well as the
recoverable reserves." 2 Without prior production history from the
property, the decline curve assumption is again a guess. Most assur-
edly, the IRS's crystal ball would afford no better insight into these
matters than that of the industry. The valuation of oil and gas
properties constantly changes as more and more information is ob-
tained and as economic conditions and technology change.""
Assuming a value is determined on the subject undeveloped
property, there are substantial risks which remain before the service
contributor will collect proceeds from oil production. For example,
all the hazards of drilling exist as well as the possibility of a dry
hole. Even if the well is drilled and completed, the well may not be
profitable if the cost of production increases to the point that the well
cannot produce in "paying quantities." Most assuredly, these uncer-
tainties played a large role in the Service's opinion in G.C.M.
22730. That approach, in all likelihood, reduced its administrative
burden in valuing such interests.
These uncertainties were discussed and considered in Vestal v.
United States.'" In that case, the taxpayer as consulting engineer
and geologist found investors for an oil and gas property, and for his
161. Telephone conversation with Harold Bentholf, geologist from Sacramento, Calif.
(June 11, 1974).
162. The decline curve is one element of the analytical engineering method of appraisal
used by the oil industry to value oil and gas properties. It measures the rate at which a pro-
ducing oil well declines in production. 3 CAMPBELL, MINERAL PROPERTY ECONOMICS 68
(1978).
163. See supra note 159.
164. 498 F.2d 487, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) V 9407 (8th Cir. 1974); see also supra
note 146 and accompanying text.
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efforts he received agreements from each investor that each would
deliver a one-eighth interest in the partnership after the investors
returned their investments from the proceeds of sale of the oil and
gas. Before the interest was conveyed, the partners sold the property
and the taxpayer was paid in cash for his interest. The taxpayer
took the position that because he received the interest in 1962 when
the agreements were entered into, the recent sale in 1964 was a sale
of a capital asset. The statute of limitations had run on tax year
1962. The taxpayer presented evidence that his interest had a value
of $29,375 in 1962 (although he did not report the value as compen-
sation in 1962) which was even found to be true by the trial court.
The IRS on the other hand, took the approach that the rights ac-
quired in the agreements were contingent and speculative and as a
matter of law did not constitute income.
It is unquestionable that the acquisition of the partnership in-
terest was "restricted" in that it was contingent on the partners re-
turning their investment before the obligation to convey to the tax-
payer arose. That point alone was sufficient to support the holding
of the court. Nevertheless, the court gave considerable attention to
the speculative valuation of the interest arrangement presented by
the government. Ironically, the IRS's argument was exactly the same
as used by the taxpayer in the cases that preceded G.C.M. 22730.165
The court said it recognized that the taxpayer's right had some
value, but that did not mean that the taxpayer received income under
the tax laws.16 The Vestal case seems to reaffirm the cases that pre-
ceded G.C.M. 22730 to the extent they relied on Burnett v. Lo-
gan. 117 Thus, it would seem that a service contributor can still argue
that the economic interest he received had an indeterminable or spec-
ulative value and thus ought not be taxed under the Burnett v. Lo-
gan1' rationale.
V. ALTERNATIVES TO THE POOL OF CAPITAL DOCTRINE
In order to provide a complete perspective on the tax treatment
of the service contributor, it is important to reflect on the alternatives
that are available. For those who are excluded from the pool of capi-
tal tax treatment, it has been suggested that the owner of the work-
165. See supra notes 76-78, 82.
166. Vestal v. United States, 498 F.2d 487, 491, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 1 9407
(8th Cir. 1974).
167. 283 U.S. 404 (1931); see also supra notes 83-85.
168. 283 U.S. 404.
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ing interest convey to the service contributor a contingent interest,
subject to a "substantial risk of the forfeiture" or subject to a restric-
tion on the transferability of the interest. The restriction, for exam-
ple, might be the performance of substantial future services.16" The
purpose for such a restricted conveyance is to evoke the deferral pro-
visions of section 83. While this may be an acceptable approach for
the employer/employee relationship, it is not necessarily acceptable
where the restricted interest is conveyed to the independent contrac-
tor, such as the attorney. The Treasury Regulations under section 83
list several examples where the restrictions are not "substantial."1 '
It would seem that the attorney would be required to perform con-
tinuing "substantial" services in order for the restriction to qualify
for section 83 income recognition deferral treatment. The practical
problems associated with such qualifications include defining and
quantifying the continuing services so that they are "substantial."
Because there are no definitions, the term "substantial" is illusive.
Another problem with placing a restriction on transfer is perhaps
archaic and academic, but nevertheless, worthy of mention in that
the issue has been the subject of much litigation recently in another
context."' That is, restrictions on alienation of real property inter-
ests are said to violate the rule against restraints on alienation. Be-
cause an economic interest is an interest in real property, it is possi-
ble that the types of restrictions contemplated under section 83 are
arguably unenforceable.' The issue is academic in the sense that it
is unlikely that the taxpayer, his heirs, or assigns would seek to in-
validate the restriction, because such an event would accelerate the
recognition of the compensation income due under section 83. And it
is mere speculation that the IRS would even raise the issue.
Another suggested alternative to the pool of capital theory is the
early formation of a partnership including the attorney, promoter, or
employer therein before the completion of the surveys and acquisi-
tion of the target oil and gas property. At this stage, the value of the
interest transferred to the service provider is clearly indeterminable
169. Glancey, Compensating Key Employees in the Oil and Gas Business, 33 SW.
INST. ON OIL AND GAS L. & TAX'N 369, 375 (1983).
170. Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(c)(2) (1978).
171. See Fidelity Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n v. Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982) (up-
holding a federally charted savings and loan association's ability to foreclose upon the violation
of a due-on-sale clause in a promissory note and deed of trust secured by a residential property
on the basis that federal law preempts state law); but see Wellenkamp v. Bank of America, 21
Cal. 3d 943, 582 P.2d 970, 148 Cal. Rptr. 379 (1978) (due-on-sale clause an unreasonable
restraint upon alienation).
172. See 1 H. WILLIAMS & C. MEYERS, OIL AND GAS LAW § 320.1, at 659-64 (1983).
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and evokes the rule of Burnett v. Logan '7  and subsequent pool of
capital cases." 4 This proposal has been suggested for syndication of
real estate developments, such as commercial and residential proper-
ties, as a way for them to get a tax free "piece of the action.' 75
There is some case support for the early partnership ap-
proach.176 And the IRS has also distinguished between a lawyer par-
ticipating in a partnership as a partner with an interest in partner-
ship assets and one acting as an agent receiving compensation
income.177
Nevertheless, the partnership should be formed and interest
therein transferred before any activity occurs. The service contribu-
tor should be limited to a profits interest only176 lest he run afoul of
the Treasury Regulations. The service contributor should plan to see
his return or services invested from the profits of the partnership and
should not sell his interest too soon after acquiring it to avoid the
invocation of the Diamond rule.179
173. 283 U.S. 404 (1931).
174. See supra notes 76-78.
175. G. ROBINSON, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF REAL ESTATE § 16.13, at 16-41-
43 (4th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1984).
176. Oil Properties Acquired for Services, 21 OIL & GAS TAX Q. 85, 86 (1972) (which
cites Weiner v. Campbell, 44 A.F.T.R. (P-H) 125, 54-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) i1 9133
(N.D.C. Tex. 1953) (the court found that the promoter/partner had formed a partnership and
as a partner, had to report only his proportionate share of the profits); and Farris v. Comm'r,
222 F.2d 320, 55-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 1 9411 (10th Cir. 1955) (the court held that where at the
formation of the partnership, one partner contributes capital and the other partners contribute
services in a drilling company, and where upon liquidation and distribution of the net assets
are prorated according to the percentage of participation of each partner, the service partners
are not required to recognize ordinary income). The court stated:
The basic concept of a general partnership is that all parties make a contribu-
tion thereto and as a result share in the assets, the profits and the losses, accord-
ing to their contribution. In the absence of a contrary provision in the agreement
where one partner contributes money or physical assets and others contribute
personal services, skills and knowledge, they share in the capital assets according
to the value placed on each contributor.
222 F.2d at 320.
177. Walls v. Comm'r, 60 F.2d 347, 1932 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9400 (10th Cir.
1932); Rev. Rul. 54-84 1954-1 C.B. 284.
178. Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b) (1960). This regulation provides:
To the extent that any of the partners gives up any part of his right to be repaid
his contributions (as distinguished form a share in partnership profits) in favor
of another partner as compensation for services (or in satisfaction of an obliga-
tion), section 721 does not apply. The value of an interest in such partnership
capital so transferred to a partner as compensation for services constitutes in-
come to the partner under section 61.
Id.
179. Diamond v. Comm'r, 492 F.2d 286, 74-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9306 (7th Cir.
1974); see supra notes 109-114 and accompanying text.
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Finally, in abundance of caution, one might structure the part-
nership interest of the service contributor to contain restrictions
which provide for "substantial risks of forfeiture" and against trans-
fer in accordance with the guidelines of section 83 and the Treasury
Regulations.
Some practical difficulties surface in the context of the partner-
ship alternative. The pool of capital concept had traditionally been
the preferred as the most flexible method of structuring a transaction
with capital, equipment and service investors. The partnership alter-
native being more complex and less flexible, may not be accepted in
the industry.'80 Perhaps, the most important aspect of the pool of
capital doctrine is that it preserves the very flexible and uncompli-
cated approach to financing and risk-spreading activities in the ac-
quisition, exploration and development of oil and gas properties. The
alternatives prove to be cumbersome substitutes for this accepted
method. Revenue Ruling 83-46 does a major disservice to the na-
tional policy and, ultimately, to every citizen who must bear the ad-
ditional energy costs caused by the Ruling's greater disincentive to
service contributors to join the pool of capital.
VI. CONCLUSION
This analysis focused on the effect of Revenue Ruling 83-46 on
service contributors to the pool of capital. It is fair to conclude that
the IRS's lack of analysis in the ruling has created an air of uneasi-
ness in the oil and gas community. The question that is being asked
is how far will the IRS go in its case-by-case approach to defining
the limits of the pool of capital doctrine. While Revenue Ruling 83-
46 is limited to the corporate promoter, the attorney, and the corpo-
rate employee, the fear is that the IRS will attempt to draw the line
at the type of service expressly mentioned in G.C.M. 22730, namely,
at the services of the well driller, and excluding all others such as the
geologist and petroleum engineer from tax deferred treatment.
By issuing the ruling, the IRS is losing its perspective by not
considering the dominant policy considerations, as well as the legisla-
tive history and construction principles that affect the governing stat-
utes, sections 61 and 83. The United States has a strong vested inter-
est in a policy that promotes competition among oil producers and
180. Telephone interview with William V. Knight, C.P.G.S., independent geologist
from Tulsa, Okla., (June 11, 1984) (he expressed the opinion that a receipt of a partnership
interest was not an acceptable substitute for the receipt of an economic interest in the
property).
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that encourages exploration and development of reserves. Revenue
Ruling 83-46 flies in the face of the national objectives so well de-
scribed in the Engle case by Justice O'Connor. Furthermore, noth-
ing in the legislative history of section 83 suggests that it was
designed to replace the operation of section 61 on unrestricted prop-
erty transferred in exchange for services. Section 83 should operate
only on restricted property. Because the original intent and scope of
section 61 survived unchanged through various statutory revisions,
including the adoption of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, a pre-
sumption arises that Congress approved of IRS administrative prac-
tices. These practices, as they relate to the pool of capital doctrine,
have been in place since 1941. Therefore, IRS's attempt to base its
conclusions on section 83 in Revenue Ruling 83-46 is erroneous to
the extent that the overriding royalty interest conveyed therein were
found to be presently vested interests.
Case law suggests that the arguments originally motivating the
IRS to adopt the pool of capital doctrine to support the "tax free"
treatment for the service contributor are as viable today as they were
in 1941. This conclusion is suggested by the Vestal case's reaffirma-
tion of the Burnett v. Logan speculative or indeterminable value
rule. More importantly, the Supreme Court in Engle reaffirmed the
spreading of risk analysis which was the very same analysis detailed
in G.C.M. 22730. Namely, this analysis holds that the owner of the
working interest spreads the risk of loss by including the service con-
tributor in the pool of capital. This policy would then encourage
exploration and development.
The case law also, however, suggests limits to the pool of capital
doctrine and, therefore, can be viewed as supportive of the IRS at-
tempt to limit the scope of the pool of capital doctrine. For example,
it is clear the pool of capital doctrine does not apply where the ser-
vices are contributed after the acquisition, exploration, or develop-
ment phase of an oil and gas property. It also does not apply where
a nonvested economic interest is converted to cash or to corporate
stock prior to vesting, or where the economic interest has a clear and
ascertainable value and is disposed of shortly after the acquisition of
the interest.
Yet, the history of the administrative practice does not justify
the IRS's sudden policy pronouncement in Revenue Ruling 83-46.
The history of private rulings shows that except in the case of corpo-
rate employees, the IRS has been supportive of the inclusion of es-
sential services into the pool of capital.
Revenue Ruling 83-46 unfairly discriminates in its determina-
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tion of which services are or are not critical to the development of the
pool of capital. For example, the pure "day rate" services of a well
driller cannot be fairly distinguished from those of the aitorney or
promoter who, because of their skills, make the development of oil
and gas properties legally and financially possible. The ruling also
has the potential of creating an administrative burden in the valua-
tion of an economic interest that has a speculative or an indetermin-
able value. The administrative burden will become a burden on the
courts as taxpayers challenge values advocated by the IRS.
It has been suggested that taxpayers, particularly, corporate em-
ployees can make section 83 work for them by urging employers to
adopt restricted or nonvested compensation plans offering, for exam-
ple, overriding royalty interest subject to risks of substantial forfei-
ture or covenants restricting transfer.
Another approach for avoiding current recognition of income in
the receipt of an economic interest in exchange for a contribution of
personal services, is one suggested by commentators for promoters of
real estate syndications. They suggest that the partnership be organ-
ized early and that the profit interest be transferred even before the
partnership interests are offered and the partnership property is ac-
quired. The service contributor to the pool of capital would receive
the economic interest before performing services and before the prop-
erty is even acquired if possible. In all cases, the service contributor
should receive the economic interest before hydrocarbons are discov-
ered and produced.
The IRS should carefully study the request for reconsideration
of Revenue Ruling 83-46.
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